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[For information on the "ethnosociology" of reciprocity and gift exchange, see Category 437.]

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gift exchange differs to some extent from the Western exchange of Christmas presents with which it is sometimes compared. In the former, as opposed to the latter system, the acquisition of desired scarce resources is a most important consideration; the fostering of social relationships is equally important in both systems. 431

Westerners often criticise Melanesians for being too grasping and mean in gift exchange. Absurd though this criticism may seem, it arises from a real cultural difference: Westerners depend on institutions other than gift exchange for the acquisition of desired scarce resources. Hence the institution of exchanging Christmas presents need serve no other end but the fostering of social relations. For the Melanesians, with a rudimentary market system, gift exchange must serve economic as well as social ends. This lack of differentiation leads to the necessary consequence that social exchange is rarely effective unless prestations of economic value are exchanged between the partners and both sides are satisfied with what they receive. 431 436

Orokaiva regard exchange relations as the *causa efficiens* of social relations; they cannot envisage any significant social relations in the absence of exchange relations and they ascribe all breakdowns in social relations to an antecedent breakdown in exchange relations. They support this view with cogent and sophisticated arguments, which will be presented throughout this work. Here, I shall quote only a few examples of their reasoning so as to give it some *a priori* plausibility. 431 436 829

One evening a women's dance practice was interrupted by an angry man calling his wife to come home. It turned out that his son's wife, who lived with the couple, had run off and returned to her village. The immediate cause of this escape was clear: he had tried to seduce her. He considered himself entirely justified in doing so as the young woman belonged to his son. To which his wife retorted that the son was hers also. The loss of the young woman, for whom bride price had been paid and whom the son would certainly expect to be reserved for him, was very serious and led to a meeting involving his clan, his wife's clan and the son's wife's clan. This meant that all of Sivepe was there, as well as a number of people from neighbouring Sasembata, the son's wife's village. A councillor was invited to adjudicate. The Sasembata people's arguments were interesting but not relevant here. The meeting was mainly concerned with what was regarded as the key problem: the conflict between the older couple. Their marriage had been unhappy for some years. The wife had been away to Port Moresby for a long time; when she returned the husband had gone away, also to Port Moresby. When he came back he found his wife was having an affair with another man. He himself was constantly chasing his three daughters-in-law. 581 586 627

The meeting addressed itself to the question of what had caused this marriage breakdown. The husband had been wrong to pursue his daughters-in-law; the wife had been wrong in committing adultery, and so on. But how did it begin? Why had the wife gone to Port Moresby in the first place? So she told the tale. She had had diarrhoea; her husband had become angry. But she kept on going out of the house. She then took some of his betelnuts to chew, and he told her in a fury that he did not want her to go to his garden any longer. She did not get food for a day and a half and then left for Port Moresby.

No further questions were asked. Once the husband had confirmed this

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account, the meeting ruled that the cause of the marriage breakdown was the husband's refusal to allow her to enter his garden. The attempted seduction, the adultery, the escapades to Port Moresby, the violent words and acts that had characterised the marriage over the years were all declared to be blameworthy, but the most serious of the offences was the husband's act in denying his wife entry to the taro garden. This signified the breaking off of the basic exchange relation in a marriage whereby the man clears the garden, the wife harvests the taro, and cooks it, and the husband and wife both eat it. I was told that when this exchange relation is broken, the marriage itself breaks down.

Why it is the taro garden where exchange between husband and wife is so important will be discussed in Chapter VI. I am concerned here to show that in tracing the cause of a marriage breakdown, what the Orokaiva seem to be looking for is evidence of a breakdown in the area of gift exchange. As long as the husband still gives his wife taro, there may be considerable difficulties between them, but these are not *defined* as a breakdown in Orokaiva culture unless there is a breakdown in Obligatory exchange.

Another such case was that of a man who took sides in a quarrel between his brother and another man who had been trying to rape, i.e. seduce by force, that brother's wife. I thought that the village generally would be on the brother's side, as rape is disapproved of, but almost everyone took the side of the rapist and the man who took the side of his brother had to leave the village. The man who was expelled had a long history of trouble making. During my stay he had been involved in every fight except those between husbands and wives. He had also committed rape, his victim being a prohibited partner under the incest rules. His trouble was, so I was told, that no woman wanted him. I asked my informants why this was. The reason was that he had been married previously, he had maltreated his wife and she had run away. Now nobody would help him. And why would nobody help him? Well, brideprice had been paid for his first wife; it had been lost through his fault, and that was the 'real' reason why nobody supported him in the quarrel. Here again we notice that the cause of the trouble was the breakdown of an exchange cycle. When a man has been helped in paying brideprice he has an obligation towards his clansmen to hold his wife, raise a family and be a support for the others. He must manage the relationship with his own affines properly and make them into valuable exchange partners.

In both instances a basic exchange cycle had been broken and that was thought to constitute the essence of the relationship. In the first case this was the exchange between man and woman in making their own contributions and deriving their own benefits in the taro garden – a cycle of exchange which parallels the cultivation cycle of the taro itself. In the second case it was the exchange between clansmen which is complete only when the man who received the brideprice provides recruits for the clan, as well as a steady new affinal alliance. It does not concern me here whether psychologists would, in such cases, accept the exchange breakdown as the real cause of the social breakdown; I have illustrated that the Orokaiva view social breakdowns in this manner.

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2. *Folk Explanations of Exchange*

Having noted how the Orokaiva diagnose cases of social conflict, let us now explore the social philosophy underlying these diagnoses. My argument will be in three steps. First, I shall restate in a more generalised form the Orokaiva ideas hinted at in the previous section; secondly, I shall express these ideas in the form of a more abstract model; thirdly, I shall show how the Orokaiva justify their ideas in terms of their own religio-philosophic system.

Orokaiva social philosophy differs from our own, in the first place by its refusal to recognise the authority of anyone outside the individual's extended family, a characteristic to which I shall give more attention later. If the Orokaiva, by and large, order their lives by the same moral principles, they would explain this by their common belief in certain demigods whom they all regard as their ancestors and as sources of authority, and who created certain institutions embodying moral norms to which they all subscribe. Not only do they obey the precepts of these demi-gods, they also re-enact their feats in ritual and identify with them during ceremonies, and in many of their regular expressive activities.

I shall therefore attempt to reconstruct what these demi-gods are said to have taught the Orokaiva about social relations. This reconstruction requires a brief analysis of some myths in which these teachings are contained. The myths all refer to events in original time. I was told that men, in their primordial or pre-cultural state, were living by the top of Mount Lamington (*Sumbiripa Kanekari*), which is traditionally regarded by the Orokaiva as the centre of the universe (Schwimmer 1969). I collected a number of myths explaining the origin of death, strife, fire, houses, marriage, clothing and several other elements of culture. The demigods who transformed human life by introducing these gifts came 'from the mountain'; Sumbiripa himself was the first man to die. He retired inside the mountain and all those who died later are said to stay with him inside the mountain. Hence the rumblings and tremors emitted by the volcano. Two published sources (Tomlin 1951, Benson 1955) show that these beliefs antedate the eruption of 1951.

While men lived by the top of the volcano, there was, according to the myths, no disunity, no quarrelling and no warfare, and men all ate with one another. As they multiplied greatly, so one of the tales records, some of them settled in an unoccupied place at the foot of a *barivo* tree. There they collected saplings, thatch and lashings to build themselves a village. One man stole lashings prepared by another and used them to build his own house. When the owner of the lashings found the thief, the two started to fight. The men present, one and all, became separated into two contending sides which never stopped fighting. *Emboavo aramiko tiketo ijunu avunu ena*: 'Therefore, from that time onwards, they dwelt separately down-valley and up-mountain.' Having started thus, they continued to be alone (*oenga oenga*) and to fight (*isoro ue mitiatera*). Separately cornered they captured, killed and ate each other and thus they then remained. In a final sentence, the narrator of the myth adds that permanent peace has now come and fighting (*isoro*) is finished.

I could not obtain data that would confirm that this stolen cord represents an umbilical cord and that this myth is about the birth trauma. However, the myth

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says that at the end of original time, warfare became an intrinsic part of social life. Two more specific messages emerge:

1. The institution created by the thief was *isoro* (intertribal warfare) which was cogently distinguished by Williams (1930: 160–6) from *embogi* (inter-clan fighting). *Isoro*, as opposed to *embogi*, takes place between groups who are geographically fairly distant, are often the speakers of different languages or dialects, and who do not usually maintain close social relations. In *isoro*, but not *embogi*, men fight to kill and eat each other. The myth therefore provides a charter for an institution by which social groups are in permanent strife with one another and permanently seek to kill and eat each other.

2. The myth states that this trife, in particular, divides the people from up-hill and down-valley. I have already pointed out that the main immediate cause of warfare around Mount Lamington was pressure of population generated on the fertile foothills, which led to groups being driven downwards, while these groups in turn drove the valley people further and further from the mountain to less desirable territory.

The social philosophy expressed in this myth is therefore based partly on the observation of ecological realities. Given a fertile centre and an increasingly infertile, but practically boundless periphery, strife is indeed endemic between social groups because the centre will continue to develop a denser population than it can support, and will always be able to muster much bigger raiding parties than the sparsely populated hinterland. It may lose battles now and then but in the long run it must be able to drive its excess population downwards. Thus the opposing forces will tend to be placed, as the myth says, up-hill and down-valley. The historical facts, as reported by Chinnery and Beaver (1916), Monckton (1921, Ch. XXIV) Williams (1930: 152–4), and Crocombe and Hogbin (1963: 14–16), all suggest that valley populations such as Aiga, Sauaha and Dobudura originally lived near the mountain and were driven off.

So far, Orokaiva social philosophy looks notably like Hobbes' view of social life as it would be in a state of nature. Between the warring groups, certainly, there appears to be no justice or injustice, but only war, and 'force and fraud are, in war, the two cardinal virtues'. How can fiduciary social relations be established at all in a world of this kind? As we know, Hobbes argued that it could be done only by the establishment of central authority, a step the Orokaiva did not take.

In order to present, as fully as possible, how the Orokaiva answered this question, I shall begin by quoting a myth told to me by Gideon of Hamburata, a village in the Sasembata district.[1] I had asked Gideon to tell me the origin of feasts, then taped the reply and translated it from Orokaiva:

> I shall tell you how feasting began.
>
> Three men, after marrying wives, set out and settled by the root of a *barivo* tree. They had twelve children. When they had enough children, they built a house and founded a village. Then, deciding to leave, they made a feast by the root of that tree.
>
> They all collected taro, made a platform, prepared all the food and got ready. Gasi, the last-born son, tied together his taro for the feast, intending

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Totoima's body, from which all derive their *ivo*. The feast seems to be the occasion *par excellence*, at which the primeval communion is re-enacted. This is, of course, a point that needs careful empirical demonstration, which will be given in Chapter VII. All I wish to suggest at this stage is the existence of at least one ritual device whereby the state of permanent *isoro* between social groups can be overcome, the re-enactment of a communion for which the Totoima myth provides the mythological charter. Such a communion may be brought about only by a long series of economic and ritual preparations, such as a feast requires; there must be an abundance of taro and of pig, there must be feathers and ornaments, new loincloths, musical instruments and guests willing to share in the communion. Above all, there must be skilful magic. Even then, the success of a feast is never predictable, and always hangs in the balance. Thus the communion between social groups, in this philosophy always remains problematic but, for various practical reasons (the need for alliances in a world at war) it is frequently attempted. The social philosophy of the Orokaiva, then, starts from the assumption of the gulf that yawns between man and man, and proceeds to delineate various techniques (of which the feast is one) to bridge it.

We are now able to see more clearly why among the Orokaiva social exchange is rarely effective unless prestations of economic value are exchanged between partners to mutual satisfaction. Relations between social groups are generally unsatisfactory and hostile, but they can be made harmonious if one side gives the other a feast, which the other side must reciprocate. The harmony thus established is an extraordinary state which is sure to be interrupted by subsequent conflicts, so that feasts must be held periodically to keep group relationships within the bounds of amity.

Relationships between individuals follow the same pattern, though gift exchange here takes the place of the larger and more formal feasts. If no presents pass between two individuals for some time, this is thought to signify a breakdown of amity and the gradual re-establishment of the *natural* hostility between man and man. Only gift exchange prevents Orokaiva society from presenting the perfect living model of Hobbes' war between all and all. It is largely for this reason that I have chosen gift exchange as the basic principle in my analysis of Orokaiva society.[2]

3. *Towards a Model of Exchange*

The feasting myth quoted in the previous section seems to me to embody the essence of Orokaiva social philosophy, in as far as it explains the basic nature of gift exchange relations. My next task will be to translate this myth into the more abstract language of social science, as must be done if its ideas are to be made part of anthropological discourse.

A feast tends to be held by two social groups between whom relations have turned somewhat sour. There may have been a war, or a murder, or some other grievous act of violence or there may have been no more than minor friction between them. One side may suspect that the other performed black magic against them. Generally speaking, however, by the premises of Orokaiva social philosophy, both sides will have been storing up some grievances against the other. Often neither side will be willing to admit to the major responsibility for

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the ill feeling that has built up; usually any attempt to assign guilt would lead only to further conflict, as the record is too tangled to be satisfactorily sorted out. The party which decides to hold the feast and to invite the other side may or may not admit that it regards itself as guilty, and that it owes the other side a debt. The past is simply set aside and the host acts as though the feast is a free gift, an expression of disinterested love and generosity. The guest at the feast accepts the same fiction.

Accordingly, if we regard a feast as an occasion for social exchange, as the Orokaiva undoubtedly do, the basic objects of exchange are repentance and forgiveness. Sometimes a few words are exchanged between host and guest to express this notion of forgiving and forgetting, though I do not suppose this is invariably the case. On one occasion I invited a man to have a feast with me, after some months during which he had been acting unpleasantly towards me for reasons I did not quite understand. I must have unwittingly offended him. After the meal he said: 'I did not really know you before now.' This implied that he was willing to forgive and forget whatever had previously annoyed him. At the same time, the fact of my inviting him indicated that I was sorry for whatever I had done wrong. What we were really exchanging was a willingness to change our attitudes to each other, which involved some effort for both of us. Whether this is, in practice, done genuinely or only ritually does not concern me here as I am discussing feasts from the viewpoint of Orokaiva collective representations. When two groups feast together, each has the obligation to feel sorry for any offence he has caused and to forgive any offence caused by the other side. It is only thus that the feast can interrupt the inherent enmity between man and man. Through the sharing of meat the two sides re-enact the communion existing in primordial times when men, as brothers, shared the body of Totoima.

An essential part of any feast is that the host should offer meat to his guest. But it is a total misapprehension of Orokaiva social philosophy to believe that it is the meat that is being exchanged for forgiveness. If that were so, it would not be essential for the two parties to consume it together. Certainly, if I have offended another person, I may make him a gift of meat in reparation. This is often done. But the reconciliation between the parties is not effected by such a gift alone. There must in addition be commensality (the common eating of taro) and communion (the common eating of meat). The meat used in such a communion is not an object of exchange. It is better described as a mediating element which makes possible the actual transaction (i.e. the exchange of repentance and forgiveness). Orokaiva are quite definite that there can be no true repentance and forgiveness between men unless meat is consumed between them. One may therefore regard meat as a *necessary* mediating element in this transaction.

Perhaps the most useful insight to be derived from Orokaiva social philosophy is that the natural form of a social relationship is cyclical and moves regularly from hostility to reconciliation and back to hostility. In other words, the Orokaiva do not see the model of a friendship, as do Westerners, in the form of a perpetual harmony, so that every conflict that arises is regarded as a deviation from the model. On the contrary, Orokaiva consider conflict as intrinsic to the model. This is true also in the discussion of quite intimate relationships: father and son, husband and wife, and so on. The perfect relationship is not one where

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829 571 no quarrels occur (Orokaiva do not seriously envisage such a relationship), but one where quarrels are resolved before they have gone too far. The Orokaiva would feel more affinity with the sociology of Simmell and Blau than with that of Weber and Parsons. A bad relationship is one where the cycle *reconciliation – quarrel – reconciliation* is interrupted, and the relationship is broken off, or the quarrel intensified until one of the parties resorts to sorcery.

829 571 We may express this view of social relations diagrammatically in the following simple model, where (*a*) stands for exchange partners, (*b*) for objects of exchange, and (*c*) for mediating elements.

574 MODEL 1



This model, first of all, contains three binary oppositions. The exchange partners are represented as opposed to one another. This corresponds to empirical reality because at any feast the persons present always belong in one of these two categories. Secondly, there are two objects of exchange between which a conversion takes place. One partner gives repentance and receives in return forgiveness. I have already pointed out that in practice both parties may feel guilty so that both may be offering repentance and forgiveness at the same time, but this is not essential and not included in the model. Furthermore, I have assumed that the host is the repentant party. This assumption is made because the person who gives the feast demonstrates thereby that he is more anxious than the other to restore the relationship. It is he, therefore, who is playing the humbler role and this is expressed in the model by making him the 'repentant' party.

It will be clear that an expression of repentance does not necessarily imply that the other party will offer forgiveness. A man may invite another to a feast and the other may refuse to come. In that case there has been repentance but no forgiveness and no feast. The exchange cycle has been interrupted by the other's refusal. But if the guest comes, he indicates that he is at least willing to forgive. Even then, the transaction may break down. There may be angry words between host and guest; the guest may expect some additional reparation and not be satisfied with what he gets. The ideal model of Orokaiva social relationships, however, assumes that the conversion will be successful.

The third binary opposition is between the mediating elements. I have already said that Orokaiva social relations move from a state of permanent strife marked by acts of hostility to temporary reconcilations mediated by the common eating of meat. There is justification for treating these concepts as binary oppositions. I have demonstrated that the common eating of meat is a mediating element because without it no exchange of repentance and forgiveness takes place. It

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goes without saying that acts of hostility are also mediating elements as, in their absence, there would be nothing to repent or to forgive.

In addition to three binary oppositions, the model contains a cyclical movement. One may start reading the diagram at any point on the cycle. For instance, one may start with acts of hostility, *isoro*. (According to Orokaiva philosophy, such acts require no special explanation.) These are followed by repentance, shown by the host in inviting the victim of these presumed acts of hostility to a feast. The sharing of meat follows, after which the guest, either in words or gesture (and probably by subsequent actions), indicates that he has forgiven whatever he had been angry about. Then, sooner or later, social relations lead to new acts of hostility and the cycle starts again.

While this model expresses adequately the Orokaiva view of social relations, we must admit at once that the feasting myth from which it was derived communicates a more complex message than this. It deals, in fact, with two exchange cycles at once, but overtly the myth does not mention the sharing of meat at all. On the contrary, it is concerned only with the sharing out of taro. The exchange partners are again host and guest; the exchange, as told in the myth, is between a shortage of taro provided by the hosts and a fight provided by the guests. The mediating elements are: the removal of the taro by a thief (arising out of the shortage; bringing about the fight) and the removal of the demigods responsible for the feast. The exchange cycle created by these elements reproduces the sequence of the myth:

MODEL 2



It will be noticed that the exchange cycle is incomplete. In the next section of this chapter, I shall show that exchange cycles in myths are always incomplete, and I shall explain why this is a special characteristic of myths. Indeed, the chief message of the feasting myth is that the incomplete cycle shown above should *not* be repeated; instead it is the following cycle that has become institutionalised:

MODEL 3



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829 571 574 [243] [789] This model is very similar to the exchange cycle in which meat is served as the mediating element. I have already pointed out that taro, displayed on a huge and impressive platform, is an essential part of the gifts offered at a feast. I did not then quote the folk explanation of this. I was told that harvest feasts are beneficial to the donors because feasts make the taro grow well. On further enquiry I found that the Orokaiva believe that taro *always* grows well except if sorcerers from other villages put a spell on it. One of the rituals at a feast is a kind of rain-making ritual performed by medicine men from among the *guests*. When I asked: 'Why the guests?', I was told that they would be expert at removing the bad magic from the gardens because, in all probability, it was they who put it there! We can now see why it is that the guests' forgiveness, in the model, leads directly to a magical increase of taro. I was also told that the increase in the taro harvest would enable the hosts to give another feast soon afterwards. As this second feast would normally not be given to the same group as the first, the idea suggested by the model is that successful feasts enable a village to give an infinite series of feasts, thus attracting an infinite number of allies, one after the other, and becoming infinitely powerful.

574 182 [243] [789] [728] In reality, however, this infinite series is interrupted by disappointing harvests and other misfortunes. Such misfortunes are ascribed to the sorcery of enemies, and in order to remove this sorcery, a *peka* is made with the enemies. A feast is held; and it is thought that matters will again improve. There is a periodicity of shortage and abundance, coinciding with the quality of external relations. Prior to the *pax Australiana*, bad external relations caused frequent warfare, the marauding of gardens or the lack of attention to gardens. Feasts had to be held occasionally so that the intensity of warfare would not lead to a serious depletion of food stocks. Feasts thus produced an abundance of food, because they provided peace, or at least a respite from war. The institution of feasting kept the scale of warfare down to a level which the people could economically afford. This ecological basis of the cyclical movement between war and peace is well documented in Rappaport's book about the Tsembaga (1968).

574 243 In terms of the model developed in this chapter we may express this cyclical process as follows:

MODEL 4



This exchange cycle belongs to the level of ecology rather than of social relations. The exchange partners in the model are man and his garden. The objects of exchange are the man's extra labour, needed to make a feast garden, and the abundance of taro that his garden can provide in good seasons. But it will not do so merely in response to man's labour. Labour alone cannot

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exhibited at every feast for guests to take home. This is an essential mediating element in the social exchange between hosts and guests, and appears as such in model 3. But why does this taro have to be there? What does it do? Why can it function effectively as a mediating element between guests and hosts? The answer to these questions lies in the myth about the origin of feasting (model 2). This myth tells the Orokaiva that if they have a big heap of taro at a feast, they *can* have effective social exchange between hosts and guest. The myth also tells them that this heap of taro is essential. The starting mechanism thus provided by the myth for the social relationship is essentially a magical one. It is a magical code rather than a moral norm, even though it has become institutionalised almost like a norm. Of course, the starting mechanism, like all magic, can fail on occasion. But unless the magic is used, there can never be social relations.

REFERENCES

1 For location of Hamburata, see Fig. 10.

2 After writing this chapter, I found that Sahlins has also been interested in Hobbes' social philosophy as in some way anticipating contemporary ideas about primitive exchange ('Philosophie politique de l' "Essai sur le don" ', 1968). Especially close to Mauss' thought is Hobbes 'Fourth Law of Nature – Gratitude' (*Leviathan*, Part I, Ch. XIV).

A [See Category 574, p. 59--Analyst]

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CHAPTER IV

THE EXCHANGE SYSTEM AND THE NEW AGE

1. *Cultural Changes*

Many significant changes have occurred in Orokaiva society since European contact. The introduction of cash cropping has made the Orokaiva, to some extent, into a peasantry, depending to a limited degree on monetised marketing. Furthermore, there has been a large amount of labour migration, mostly by male workers whose families stay behind in villages. Even in the villages, technological innovations have been influential in raising productivity and improving standards of living, while sharply reducing the game population. People have become accustomed to the existence of a specialised political authority, wielded by Australians but supported and assisted by Papuan functionaries. Inter-village and inter-tribal warfare has been effectively suppressed. The Orokaiva give at least nominal allegiance to Christianity, and thus to the principle of obedience to an omnipotent god.

These changes have profound implications for Orokaiva political philosophy. As we have seen, the Orokaiva recognised the importance of Hobbes' question: how can a man avoid a perpetual war between all and all? The answer, briefly, was that social order can be created by a system of exchange partnerships. But this was not Hobbes' own answer nor that of the Australians who now rule New Guinea. If the changes pursued by the colonial government are wholly successful, it is clear that exchange partnerships, as the basic source of social order, must become subordinate to legitimate central political authority and the modern market economy. In other words, there is what Gluckman calls a 'contradiction' (1965: 109) between Australian policy and the exchange-oriented Orokaiva social philosophy. It is possible, but cannot be predicted, that this 'contradiction' will eventually lead the Orokaiva to abandon their traditional exchange ideology. In the meantime, however, it is already clear to the Orokaiva that their world view is being seriously challenged by white wealth and power.

The effect of pressure on the exchange system is evident in many spheres. In the economic sphere, the Orokaiva still carry on most of their non-monetary transactions by the traditional system, using gift exchange between consanguines, affines and bond friends. Furthermore, gifts of money are being made along traditional lines, money being used either as a substitute for *hambo* and other valuables, or as gifts from urban migrants to country kin. On the other hand, store-bought goods are, by a general convention, excluded from the full operation of the exchange system, only a minority being distributed as gifts. The

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> When a summons was issued by the village constable, then those magic things were put to work (to save the accused from conviction) . . .
>
> In those days men worked for a while but then stopped shifting the earth. The village constable bound them and they went to court in Kokoda. If the court thought they were lying or if they said 'I don't know,' they were taken away and the governor stopped their work. This is the tale of those men of olden days.

Although the passages quoted here are full of obscurities, the situation in which these speeches were delivered makes them worthy of careful analysis. The councillor, who was born in Torogota, had recently moved to Kongohambo, a neighbouring village built in modern style. Some families had accompanied him, but he wanted Torogota village to be abandoned altogether and the whole population transferred to Kongohambo. In his first speech, he gave reasons with which he hoped to persuade his people. We are thus given a glimpse of the social philosophy of his listeners. Although the latter had no intention of leaving Torogota, they did share the basic sentiments to which the councillor appealed. They agreed communal ownership of land was no longer quite fashionable, the village was getting too old, too much land was lying idle, it was bad for labourers to be unreliable, it was bad to kill wayfarers like dogs. They desired to emulate the feats of their ancestors and they knew this could no longer be done by raiding neighbouring villages. This traditional road to renown is no longer open; obviously, new roads have to be found.

The main burden of the councillor's speech was that his people had not found these new roads to power: *ivo ambupu-ta ahihijera*. (Strong ancestors have reared feeble descendants.) *Ivo* (strength, power) is a basic concept in Orokaiva thought, and is somewhat similar to the Polynesian concept *mana*. It is the quality that enables man to be successful in 'ways with which ordinary technique cannot cope' (Firth 1967: 191). It is transmitted to a man by his father at the time of conception, and is augmented by the fact of success, and particularly by the killing of an animal or an enemy, the eating of meat, or the making of gifts. Bohuka, the ancestor of the councillor's lineage, and his companions, undoubtedly had *ivo* which was augmented by their conquests, but his descendants who inherited this *ivo* stood to lose it unless they themselves achieved something of commensurate importance. The Orokaiva, unlike the Tikopia, do not think of this magical efficacy as being essentially an attribute of chiefs or leaders, though men of influence do have *ivo* to an exceptional degree. In the terms of the theory developed in the present work, *ivo* is always an object of exchange, received from an exchange partner, often in the form of meat, as will be shown in Chapter VII. The ultimate source of *ivo*, however, are *dema* figures such as Totoima and Pekuma who first gave *ivo* to man.

The councillor's second speech is one of several pieces of evidence that lead me to suggest that the Orokaiva regard Jesus Christ as a *dema* figure and a powerful source of *ivo*. A Papuan pastor was the first to put this idea to me when we discussed an Orokaiva dance performed at his Church during the Christmas service. The dancers, dressed in traditional garb and beating drums, filing in a wide circle past the cross erected on the mission station, sang a traditional chant originally performed after a victim had been killed in a cannibal raid. The pastor drew my attention to the similarity between the killing of such

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dismissed by a seeker of ancient lore, but contained some myths of obviously recent vintage which helped me to understand contemporary Orokaiva thought. I was told that before the Europeans came, the Orokaiva used to make only very small gardens. They were in constant danger of starvation and depended greatly on wild fruit. I copied the names of these, but was told that many of them were never eaten nowadays. (Many are inedible.) In those days, people did not make feasts as they did not grow enough food. The large gardens people have at the present time were introduced only when the Europeans brought steel axes and knives.

In other villages I was told similar stories about a primordial state of wretchedness when people cultivated no taro but ate wild fruit now considered inedible. But this period ended when the *dema* introduced the elements of traditional Orokaiva culture. In Hohorita, culture history had become foreshortened. Other Orokaiva distinguished the traditional *dema* stories which occurred in the dim past from the stories concerning the arrival of the Europeans; they recognised in fact *two* periods of fundamental change: one ancient and complete, the other recent and incomplete. In Hohorita tradition, these two periods have to some extent become fused. The premature death of men born between, say, 1890 and 1910 deprived the men of today of any factual knowledge of the coming of the European: it has already been turned into myth and placed, so to speak, *in illo tempore*. But this unusual development only emphasises how closely the gifts of European culture are identified with those of traditional *dema*.

The chairman of the Higaturu Local Government Council, who also happened to live at Hohorita, had long conversations with me about the constitution and activities of the council. On one occasion I wished to discover to what extent the council had been set up in response to popular aspirations and to what extent the councillors (as opposed to the Australian adviser) made decisions on basic policy. Answer: because the government had a council at Rabaul, it decided to have one in the Northern District as well. Did the people want the council? They had been given schools; they had been given coffee to market. They therefore thought the council would also be good. Would it not be better for the people to decide for themselves how their problems should be solved instead of leaving all decision-making to the government? The council did not come from ourselves but from the administration. We do not know about the council. It belongs to the administration and it was given to the village people.

The Department of District Administration had recommended this informant to me as being the most knowledgeable in the district on the subject of the council. I found his knowledge of the facts to be most accurate, and at council meetings he was the only man who dared to argue with the advisory officer. But when I questioned him on the level of social philosophy, he fell back on the standard Orokaiva explanation: power and strength come to us not from things we have invented or made ourselves, but from things that have been given to us by our exchange partners. This is precisely what Councillor Ase said: if the Orokaiva of today desires to have an *ivo* equal to that of his ancestors, he has to follow the instructions of the council, i.e. to build a new village, grow coffee, individualise land titles. This, at the present time, is his best available source of power and strength. In other words, it is not a matter of villagers independently

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623 working out a development policy, but rather of obeying a sacred formula that
657 came to the Australian authorities from a *dema*-like source and was then passed
177 on as a gift to the Orokaiva.

829 Are all these gifts derived ultimately, in Orokaiva estimation, from Jesus
[123] Christ, or are there other *dema* figures as well to whom these gifts are ascribed? Who would they be? This is a hard subject for a white anthropologist to inquire into. Informants answer: 'We do not know. Nobody has told us.' The anthropologist feels uneasily that if anyone knows the source of Western wealth and power, it ought to be himself rather than his informants.

3. *New Exchange Cycles*

121 The image of post-contact history reconstructed here from statements by Orokaiva informants seems unduly dreamlike and idealised. This is because they are statements about the metaphysical starting mechanisms making social relations possible. Turning to the relationships themselves, I find that they are often marred by a severe conflict of interests and values. For the purpose of a brief overview, we shall consider relationships with representatives of three types of European-introduced institutions: church, commerce, and government. Following our theoretical scheme, we shall be especially interested in the objects that are exchanged in these relationships and in the mediating elements that make possible social exchange.

461 An employer of Papuan labour is interested chiefly in obtaining the
466 compliance of his workers by the payment of money. Usually he is not at all
829 interested in social exchange, but in a contract whereby he acquires the total
437 work output of the worker for the period he is on the job. The Orokaiva,
177 however, regards all the work he does as part of a social relationship with the person for whom he works. First of all, he expects that person to feed him while he is working. This is because he has been prevented by the person he is helping from going to his own garden. The employer in New Guinea usually does feed his workers, subtracting the cost of the food from the wages he pays. But secondly, the Orokaiva, lacking a long tradition of wage labour, regards his work as a long series of gifts to his employer enabling him to claim return gifts. He does not think of his wages as being a total discharge of his employer's obligations. They were promised at the beginning, but since then many unpredictable things have happened: he has loyally looked after his employer's interests in a series of small crises; he finds he has additional urgent needs he did not envisage when he agreed to come to the job; he believes his labour has yielded his employer vast profits. As the Orokaiva understand a social partnership, events of this kind all create a claim upon the person who has received help. Thus, the worker keeps on pressing his employer most persuasively for extra gifts of various sorts, in addition to his wages. This pattern is found throughout New Guinea and is known as the *baksheesh* system. Employers often give in to the demands, hand out various extras, and allow for these costs in plantation budgets.[3]

466 The basic significance of the *baksheesh* has already been pointed out by
437 Mauss (1966: 250–5, 229–32); '*La chose ainsi transmise est, en effet, chargée de*
177 *l'individualité du donateur.*' It rests on a notion that both worker and

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177 these two sacraments became pivotal, while the rest of Church life, however
797 deeply experienced, seems to be a supplementary benefit. I am speaking, be it understood, of a group of rather recent converts.

553 When I asked informants why they had joined the Church I was given one
551 invariable answer: 'to receive a new name.' The meaning of this is clear and
797 unequivocal, and follows from information already published by Williams (1930: 97, 175–7). An Orokaiva, under the traditional system, might have three types of name: (1) a 'name proper' (*javo be*) taken from a stock of names used by his father's or mother's patrilineage and conferred at birth; (2) one or more nicknames (*javo isapa*) which may be acquired at any age; (3) assumption by the slayer of the name of the slain. Williams reported that there was also a common habit of bestowing the victim's name upon the child of the slayer. The name of the slain is adopted as a distinction, and as a means of acquiring the latter's *ivo*. Baptismal names fall within this third category, for what the Orokaiva regards as obvious reasons.

First of all, baptismal names are never Orokaiva names, but are chosen from a large stock known to servants of the Church. Some are recondite names (Cephas, Stanislaus, Gemima), other are a combination of the Christian and surnames of missionaries (Dick Stafford, Nancy White). All these names, used by the mission for baptismal purposes, are reasonably regarded as names belonging to Jesus Christ. Now, Christ was slain by His enemies. After His death, those who adopted one of His names were saved and obtained great wealth and power.
[778] White men are powerful because they obtained the *ivo* of this slain Man. The mission gave Orokaiva the opportunity to acquire one of these names too, if they obeyed its rules. Thus a baptismal name fulfils the same function as was fulfilled by the adoption of the name of the slain. *Ivo* can now be obtained without the need to kill a human victim; in fact, it has now become not only useless but evil to kill people in order to assume their names. The baptismal name has taken their place.

An important parallel between the two kinds of name is that a person cannot confer either upon himself. This can be done only after a person has gone through rituals of purification by a man of great purity and renown. The eating of the body of the slain can confer *ivo* only if this communion food is a gift from some other person; similarly, bread and wine are spiritually potent only if given by a priest in a proper ritual. I have already pointed out the similarity perceived by Orokaiva between communion and the traditional rite of eating slain victims. Communion may be called the culminating ritual of the *iji eha* when Jesus Christ fully becomes the celebrant's spiritual ancestor, much in the manner of Totoima, and with similar potent effects.

797 This sketch is not at all intended as a criticism of the mission. On the
177 contrary, time probably has to pass before the Orokaiva can move from their present identification with the Church to the internalisation of its values. And it has been argued (e.g. Kelman 1962) that identification is often a necessary preliminary of change. Even the degree of change described here has been by no means easy to achieve. The ideology of the *iji eha* which underlies the present acceptance of socio-economic programmes as well as of Christianity, was long
[829] resisted by Orokaiva, even after the Second World War. A premise of this acceptance has been a growing opinion that the Western world order was indeed

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so formidable and irresistible as to leave open no other option. For many Orokaiva, this became a certainty only as a result of what to us would seem an entirely unconnected event, namely the Mount Lamington eruption of 1951. The effect of this eruption on Orokaiva ideology is worth a brief analysis here because it provides evidence that the 'new day' ideology is still essentially based on the traditional exchange-oriented Orokaiva philosophy. We find that the cataclysm was universally ascribed by the Orokaiva to the breakdown in an exchange relationship with some *dema*, and that many believed this *dema* to have been the Christian God. On the basis of this theory, the Orokaiva were led to search for more effective mediating links between themselves and these powers, so as to avoid similar misfortunes in the future. Development activity and baptism were the most important of the mediating elements in which they placed their faith.

As I have already published a full survey of Orokaiva explanations of the eruption (Schwimmer 1969), my summary here will be brief. In 1966, during visits to Inonda, Hohorita and Sivepe, I interviewed a number of survivors about the explanation of the disaster given by people *at the time it occurred*. All informants were agreed that at that time the increasing rumbling in the mountain, the tremors, the smoke issuing from the crater, the showers of ash, the emission of stones and fiery particles, and finally the Peléan eruption, were all ascribed to the anger[6] of Sumbiripa, the god of the mountain, though there were varying explanations of the probable cause of that anger. These statements tallied with published evidence from two clergymen, both present in the Northern District at the time of the eruption, who refer to the people's fear of the anger of Sumbiripa (Tomlin 1951, Benson 1955).

Evidence of a different kind comes from two anthropologists (Belshaw 1951, Keesing 1953) both of whom interviewed survivors a few weeks after the disaster. Belshaw summarises Orokaiva explanations as follows:

> Some people said that this was God's visitation because they had disobeyed the Bishop's instructions to build new churches. Others said that God had punished them because they had not helped the Allies sufficiently during the war and because some of them had betrayed missionaries to the Japanese. (Others again mentioned) lack of co-operation in Mission and Government plans for development. (1951: 242)

Keesing agrees with this summary, adding that the eruption resulted in 'strong feelings of insecurity and even of guilt in their retrospective look at the pre-eruption way of life'.

Many resident Europeans, including the Bishop of New Guinea, the Most Rev. David Hand, confirmed Belshaw's and Keesing's account, but the Bishop told me that the mission has since discouraged the Orokaiva from thinking that the Christian God harboured anger against them and expressed it with such indiscriminate violence.[7] Hence this explanation is no longer heard. People nowadays believe that the eruption was caused by the anger of Sumbiripa or, if they wish to display a modern scientific attitude, they will repeat what they have been told about vulcanology.

Explanations based on the anger of Sumbiripa, the government and the Christian God resemble each other in that they are all based on the concept of a

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lies neither in communion nor in expiation, as they are essentially magical devices to bring about a transformation in social relations with a partner.[1]

While this partner may on occasion be a close kinsman who is given a feast for some special reason, he often has a rather distant position in the exchange network of the donor, with whom commensality occurs only on rare occasions. Not only do feasts tend to extend in this way the range of individual social networks but they are especially apt to extend the range of social relations existing between villages. Feasts are often given by one village to another, thus leading to the establishment of at least one partnership between each household of the host village and each household of the guest village.

The explanation of pig sacrifices requires an elaboration of my model of exchange. The models used so far may be called *transactional*. One may distinguish between positive transactional cycles (in which the two sides exchange benefits mediated by gifts) and negative transactional cycles (in which the two sides exchange sanctions mediated by penalties). In addition one may construct *temporal* cycles, which may show the alternation between friendship and anger, offence and repentance, mortification and forgiveness. A violation of the exchange code will shift a relationship from a positive into a negative transactional cycle, while a reconciliation feast will restore positive reciprocity. The value of pig sacrifices lies in their power to set a relationship upon a course of positive exchanges where, previous to the sacrifice, the two sides were engaged in a mutually injurious exchange of sanctions.

This implies an assumption about the nature of social relations: namely that they cannot be described as intrinsically positive or negative. One cannot divide the Orokaiva social universe into concentric circles distinguishing between permanently friendly and permanently hostile groups. The most one may do (if one has data over a sufficient period) is to show that in the association between villages A and B the cycles of negative reciprocity have been relatively short while between villages A and C they have been relatively long. In this sense one may call B a 'friendly' and C a 'hostile' village, and it may be expected that inter-village feasts, in which pig sacrifices figure, will be more frequent between A and B than between A and C.

This conceptualisation is not based on my own private theory of sociality, but on the Orokaiva expressed belief that strife is a 'natural', i.e. *dema* established consequence of social relations. This belief implies that any relationship will tend to alternate between positive and negative cycles, primary kin relationships not excepted. In *original time*, we find only positive cycles of reciprocity; strife periodically engenders negative cycles, while pig sacrifices lead to the periodic restoration of positive reciprocity.

2. *The Wild Pig: Marauder*

To the Orokaiva the wild pig is above all a troublesome enemy, as it attacks taro crops in gardens and is liable to kill an unwary hunter. It lives in the jungle where it is believed that ghosts (*sovai*) may enter its body. A pig inhabited by a *sovai* is especially dangerous and harmful to man. The ontology of the pig is explained in a series of myths of which the following, recorded by Williams, states its message most clearly:

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killed and eaten and is remembered as the demigod who made these gifts to mankind. When such gifts are made today it would seem that the donor is symbolically sacrificing himself to the recipients. The custom of giving clothes and cooking pots goes back to a myth where a woman is described as living alone and naked and without fire, so that she had to prepare her food by letting the sun burn it. Two men came, gave her a skirt, brought her fire and thus acted as her deliverers. These gifts, far from being 'equivalent' to a woman, are male gifts *for* a woman, and emphasise the blessings of the cultural institution of marriage. On the significance of ornaments as part of a wedding gift I am less certain, but the evidence suggests that they are pledges. They are objects of great magical power, the mere possession of which is thought to demonstrate that their owner adheres to moral principles. The gift of such objects to another party demonstrates that the donor possesses such moral objects, pledges that he will show propriety in his behaviour towards the recipient and enjoins the recipient to do the same for him.

In combination, the *dorobu* gifts convey a clear and appropriate message: the wife-taker acknowledges his indebtedness, emphasises that by taking a woman in marriage he conveys a great blessing upon her and makes pledges which ideally are binding on both parties. Acceptance of these gifts need imply no more than that the wife-givers acquiesce in the *status quo* (which has been established by abduction or elopement). Until the affines make counter gifts, *dorobu* does not even establish social relations between the two sides. This does not happen until the bridegroom's sister has bred and given a pig to him and until the bride's mother has bred and given a pig to her son-in-law. It is only then that a limited commensality between the two sides is established: they have a meal together at which the *imbohi* pretends to eat.

The continuing avoidances and dangers characteristic of Orokaiva affinal relations are all of a kind very familiar in other parts of the world, but the less usual feature is that joking relations, coldness and deliberate social distance can be terminated by the cancellation of the debt through exchange marriage. The strife of 'ordinary' affinal relations is seen as part of a longer cycle which stretches from the sister exchange marriage established as ideal by the ancestors to exchange marriages that remain present as a constant possibility.

9. *Application of the Model to Clan Formation*

The model of marriage exchange as presented here envisages the permanent cyclical recurrence, in the history of any given social group, of restricted and generalised exchange, or – as one might say – of a state of matrimonial amity and strife, unity and division. This model is given additional credibility if we consider some Orokaiva theories about social relations and if we consider the processes of clan formation.

On social philosophy only a very brief reference is appropriate here. The Orokaiva believe that due to actions of their primal ancestors, men are in permanent strife with one another and for that reason dwell apart in separate villages. They express this belief quite explicitly when explaining some of their own myths. I have described above (Chapter III) an Orokaiva myth on the origin

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of feasts, explaining why there is a rule that feasts may be held only when it is ritually established that food will be plentiful.

Discussion of this myth made it clear that the feast is regarded as a purely temporary interruption of the state of strife, but that it can restore a temporary harmony if ritual is properly observed. The feast-givers must have an abundance of food; they must give everything they have to their guests. Their ancestors will then bless them; their enemies will remove evil spells from their lands, and their gardens will greatly prosper afterwards.

At a feast the Orokaiva became ritually and spiritually identified with their primal ancestors and re-enact the peace and harmony that existed in original time before strife began. It was, however, the traditional belief that such a state could not be expected to last; that after the feast strife would re-assert itself. The myth instructed man to hold feasts 'from time to time', the interval between one feast and another being characterised by food shortage and warfare. Peace was not considered to be a possible permanent state, though my informants remarked that since the coming of the white man it had become so.

We find a similar cyclical pattern in the marriage practices of social groups. Let us take as the commencement of the cycle a crisis such as a military defeat or serious quarrel which leads a fragment of a social group to separate, move some distance away and establish a new settlement. Such a group will usually begin to intermarry with new groups using devices such as abduction and elopement. Gradually, they will set up a number of reciprocal arrangements with groups in the vicinity. When relations with reciprocating groups become very close, the time will come, usually after two or three generations, when marriages between these groups become impossible under the rules. At this point the former affines have all been turned into notional consanguines. Unless the two sides quarrel (which is not infrequent), the stage is now set for clan fusion.

It could be demonstrated, from a detailed analysis of Sivepe marriages, that the composition of both the Seho and the Jegase local clan groups may be explained by this process. Three of the four 'lineages' of which the Jegase group is composed have migrated to Sivepe since the beginning of the century. One of the waves of migrants already bore the clan name Jegase when they lived at Kiorota, their village of origin. The other two groups assumed it quite recently, after more than two generations of residence and intermarriage. Seho was welded together a good deal earlier than Jegase, so that the lineages are no longer commonly distinguished by name, and the ideology of common agnatic origin is far more firmly established. Seho must, however, have had four lineages at one time and I was able to establish the village of origin of three of them, as well as numerous intermarriages with the Seho of Sivepe after arrival. Intermarriage seems to have become more difficult between these Seho lineages about fifty years ago, and fusion must have been complete by 1925. A marriage between two Seho lineages arranged around 1935 was the last, and caused much annoyance though there was no common *hae*.

I am not suggesting that the process described here explains all Orokaiva clan fusions, but only that the marriage system does in fact turn groups of affines into consanguines and that these consanguines if they live close together tend to assume a common clan name. The importance of this process for the study of kinship structure lies in the fact that it is explicable neither by rules of restricted

Chapter 1

Introduction

There is no local consensus as to which peoples in the Northern District should be regarded as Orokaiva (see Williams 1930:1-4), but all the peoples concerned recognize that they have a relatively uniform culture and speak mutually intelligible dialects of one language. The people in this culture area number at least 25,000.

Although they did not have an inclusive name for themselves until 'Orokaiva' was introduced by Europeans, they generally drew the distinctions among themselves between river people, salt water people, and inland people (umo-ke, eva'embo and periho). There are wide-spread traditional beliefs dealing with the common origins not only of these different categories of people, but also of mutually hostile tribes, the largest political units among them, and of the various dialectal groupings and local cultural variants, which correspond to a limited extent with the political division into tribes.[1]

Our study of Sivepe was designed to complement a study of land, work and productivity at Inonda village (Crocombe and Hogbin 1963) and other related studies in the area (Dakeyne 1965; Howlett 1965; Crocombe 1964; and Cheetham). We attempt no general comparison with the results of the other studies at this stage.

Because land tenure problems were central to our investigations, the groups at Inonda and Sivepe were chosen from villages in the Higaturu Native Local Government Council area which is occupied by about 12,000 of the Orokaiva. In 1956 this council adopted a scheme to register individual title to parcels of land which would be allocated by land-holding groups to individual members for use as cash-crop gardens. The scheme had encountered several

[1] See Williams 1930:155; W.47, 140, 148; 0.40, 411, 486, 598, 640; Folktales Nos.45, 54. W.47,... 0.40,... Folktales, etc., refer to the notation used by Williams in his fieldnotes, see Bibliography, p.121.

that studied at Inonda - was the relationship between localized landholding patrilineal groups and their resources. The first group selected was that known as Jegase, which is intermediate in size among the 3 major groups in the village; in order to free our sample of possible bias in its age-structure and other physical characteristics, we also included the smallest group, the Timumu. This addition happened to bring the size of the sample to 50 persons.

The inclusion of the second discrete patrilineal group slightly broadened the base of our enquiries, but study of the Jegase provided the most significant data on the subject of land tenure. The sample was made up of 12 households, 8 of them Jegase and 4 Timumu; 10 of the 12 houses contained a nuclear family, 1 contained a widower living alone and the other a widower and 2 close kinsmen dependent on him (see Genealogy on p.52 for links between households). The third major group in the village is known as Seho. Jegase, Timumu and Seho are in fact the names of 3 non-exogamous dispersed patrilineal clans[1] with branches also in other villages containing such fragments of several clans. These fragmented descent units are social categories (see Ch.3) whose members do not have 'ipso facto obligations of a specific kind'.[2]

Our observations at Sivepe were supplemented by less systematic interviews with other villagers in what we will call 'the neighbourhood'. We find this term convenient, taking Sivepe as a point of reference, for a region which includes the villages whose members interact closely with Sivepe in the spheres of interest which we examined. It is not a social group even though there is only a small proportion of these villages outside the territory of the group named Awala.[3]

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[1] Often referred to as clans by the people themselves, so that, with the possible exception of orope (see Crocombe and Hogbin 1963:17), 'clan' seems to be the only current general term in local usage, which designates a distinct type of grouping based on descent.

[2] See definition of 'clan' in Royal Anthropological Institute, 1960.

[3] Its perimeter is about the same as the limits of the outermost of the local 'zones' within which a notable majority of Sivepe marriages have been concentrated over 3 genealogical generations (see p.48-9). There are suggestions of a tendency at Sivepe for intervillage visiting, associated generally with direct or secondary economic interests, to be confined to villages within such a spatial range, quite small compared with the wide network of similar links in the case of Inonda (P. Krinks and E. Waddell: personal communication).

Chapter 3

Land tenure and social structure

a. The tribe and clan as territorial or political units

128 This section outlines the range of wider common territorial interests and concerted political action among traditional [614] groupings. Clans are the largest units in which membership is [619] determined by patrilineal filiation as distinct from the local allegiance underlying membership of the tribe, and of the 'district', village, etc., into which the tribe may be divided.

619 The tribe is the largest unit which has a common territory (Williams 1930:156-7). This is usually isolated from neighbouring tribal territories by a belt of uninhabited country and its occupants would speak of it as 'one ground', pusu tahavo. The territories of groups of various orders of inclusiveness within the tribe are also described in this way (see Williams 0.364; 1930:157).

●[829] Members of a group of any of these levels might consider themselves as toho, 'countrymen' (see Williams 1930:166; 0.100, 364). In another context a group would consider others in the same tribe as kitoho (outsiders, aliens). All members of the tribe shared common enmities so that at times they would regard themselves as toho whereas neighbouring tribes were always considered kitoho.[1]

[578] There were customary restrictions upon feuding within the tribe. As Williams (1930:309 ff.) points out, this political unit is the largest group with its own intragroup morality, in this case [266] sharply distinguished from the standard forms of hostility between [721] tribes. Aggression against members of another tribe took the form of organized, often cannibalistic raids (isoro).

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[1] Williams (1930:160) mentions exceptions where 'friendship or affinity between certain tribes allowed the use of the former word' (toho), but 'tribes...normally stand in the mutual relation of Kitohu' (sic) (ibid: 170; see also 0.100, 364).

101 Beaver (1915: Appendices 3 and 4) speak of the Jegasa-Sarua (or Jigasa or Jegasa-Sarana) and of the Atibi Guma (or Atibeguma) as tribes but are inconsistent in locating them in relation to their neighbours.

Since 'Wasida' people were allied with Sangara groups in fighting their neighbours to the north (the Divinikovari, Togahau, etc.), Williams' only grounds for treating the 'Wasida' as members of the same tribe as the Hunjovarehu and as opposed to other neighbours, including the Sangara[1] is the precedent sent by Chinnery and Beaver (1915:48) who claimed that their map of linguistic areas 'will show with tolerable clearness the various groups of tribes'; although Williams claims that 'the ultimate bases of the tribal division are political and economic' (1925:406), he states that his classification is based on their list of linguistic differences (1930:5) and follows them 1930:150 and end map; 0.9) in placing Divinikovari in the 'Wasida' area; he himself adds (ibid.) that this language classification 'apparently does not coincide with the tribal classification' since the Divinikovari (i.e., Hunjovarehu) and 'Wasida' are of different tribes.

Belshaw (1951:2) and Plant (1951: Appendix 4) prefer 'Periho' to 'Wasida' as a tribal name. The local people agree at least that 'Wasida' is inaccurate because it is really the name of a village[2] and may refer only to its inhabitants, or sometimes also to its immediate neighbours - just as Sivepe villagers may be called Avala people after the nearby village of that name; this identification with a named group of villages or 'hamlet group' seems to be weaker than it was even a decade ago.

[829] On the other hand 'Periho' (alternatively 'Berepo') is a general term for 'bush', that is inland peoples,[3] used by those closer to the coast (usually to the east) and is applied by them indiscriminantly to several tribes - at times to the Sangara (Williams 1930:6; 0.410). The Sivepe people are sometimes spoken of as the 'Kombu Periho' (kombu, from or of, a mountain or height);[4] they prefer to use the term 'Kombu Sangara' when referring to themselves and other Orokaiva from the slopes of Mt Lamington.

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[1] Plant (1951: Appendix 4) also argues against this.

[2] Williams was aware of this (W.10) although he usually chose to retain the European-introduced usage, sometimes referring thus, as with 'Jegasi-Sarahu', to the tribe as he saw it and sometimes to the group of villages in the tribe.

[825] [3] One meaning of 'periho' is a small wild pig from the bush.

[4] This is applicable a priori to the Sangara.

[p. 106 is blank]

Security of tenure

423 It is often suggested that the main benefit from tenure conver-
241 sion is the provision of security of tenure for villagers who wish
to plant cash crops. The Ombi-Tara people, however, did not con-
[182] sider security of tenure as a major benefit of conversion. They
[829] explained that each man had previously held individual rights to
land which were sufficiently secure for him to plant cocoa and
coffee. A man could plant such cash crops without consulting the
clan leader or other members of his clan, and without others
disputing ownership of the crop or distribution of the proceeds.
[578] Fourteen people did mention that conversion and the introduction
of cement and wooden corner pegs would help to prevent disputes;
but they felt the disputes to have been caused by the previous
small size of individual plots which sometimes made it difficult
for a man to extend his planting (because he would be encroaching
on another's land); and to vagueness of boundary lines. Some also
referred to the need to clearly mark out land boundaries to fore-
stall potential encroachment by persons from outside Ombi-Tara.[1]

Consolidation of holdings

423 Most Ombi-Tara people saw consolidation of their previously
311 scattered holdings as the main benefit from tenure conversion.[2]
361 Many people drew finger diagrams on the ground to explain how
[829] conversion led to consolidation. Under the traditional tenure
system cash cropping involved long walks from village to food
gardens and to cash crops.[3] Consolidation not only reduces walk-
ing time, but also allows an individual to undertake large-scale
planting in a single area. He was previously unable to do this
because of the small amount of land he held in each plot, and in
some cases because of the small total amount of land to which he

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[1] In contrast to the Ombi-Tara situation Crocombe and Hogbin (1963:72-80) found in another Orokaiva village that lack of security of tenure was a factor discouraging certain individuals from planting cash crops.

[2] Mentioned by thirty of the thirty-seven blockholders interviewed, including the four most influential people - Charles, the two clan leaders and the Local Government Councillor. These people should be distinguished from the 20 per cent or so mentioned earlier for whom the innovation of conversion was less significant than the change to planting rubber.

[3] Waddell (1966:7) found in another Orokaiva village that time spent travelling to and from places of activity was about 15 per cent of the total time devoted to that activity.

423 had rights.[1] Conversion has caused a redistribution of land rights,
311 with some people losing and others gaining land. Several men who
361 claimed they had less land after conversion than before said that
829 twenty acres was ample for their needs and that they were pleased to give up some land to help their co-villagers.

657 There are indications that conversion at Ombi-Tara has facili-
423 tated co-operation between villagers who are planting cash crops.
182 Previously any man who wished to plant cash crops had to work with
476 little assistance, often in a relatively inaccessible area. Since conversion has been introduced, the new road gives easy access to all blocks and people are more easily able to help one another.

361 Paradoxically, conversion to individual holding of land appears
491 to have strengthened intervillage, interclan and interpersonal co-operation and to have fostered a community spirit. Intervillage
657 co-operation is demonstrated by the establishment of a joint Ombi-
423 Tara bank account to purchase equipment for the bush rubber
621 processing unit, and by joint discussions on the nature of the new tenure system. Interclan co-operation is seen in the leader
182 of the Kusi clan granting permission for the allocation of a block on Kusi land to a man of Mumu clan. Interpersonal co-operation is illustrated by the apparent willingness of large landholders to give up all previously held land rights without receiving any compensation, in order to enable all to take part equally in the scheme.

657 The Ombi-Tara people are pleased and flattered that many people
423 visit and inspect the blocks. They heard that Ombi-Tara was men-
182 tioned on the radio and are happy that others ('people all over
186 Papua-New Guinea') should know of their experiment. When two Australian friends of mine paid a short visit to Ombi they were asked with expectant pride if they had heard of the Ombi-Tara scheme in Australia. The leader of the Mumu clan said, 'We want Ombi-Tara to have a big name like England, Japan, Hong Kong, Rabaul and Lae'.

Publicity and information

657 Most Ombi-Tara people (82 per cent) said that they first heard
423 of the possibility of converting land to holding under individual
177 title after the visit of the Agricultural Officer in late 1963. No one reported hearing first about conversion through Local Government Councils, from the Anglican Mission, on the radio or through

[1] The then District Agricultural Officer considered consolidation of fragmented holdings to be one of the main benefits that would emerge at Yega, the first tenure conversion scheme in the Northern District (Belfield 1962:1-2).

657 been at Ombi-Tara, in favour of briefer parties which distract less
423 from market oriented activities.[1]

182 There was verbal evidence at Ombi-Tara of further rejection of
[829] old customs since the introduction of tenure conversion. Informants often suggested that conversion marks the beginning of a new life - 'Before we were not using our land well but now we are changing everything and we will live better'. Several previous innovations in the Northern District have been greeted in like fashion (see Belshaw 1951:249, and Crocombe 1964a:29-32).

[622] Leadership in the traditional societies of Papua-New Guinea is
[554] generally not inherited but achieved through personal excellence in economic and political organisation and the main activities of the society including a knowledge of land tenure arrangements. It
[614] was decided by the members of the Mumu clan that their clan leader was too old to understand and adapt to the new land system. His son was not considered clever enough to succeed him and eventually the thirty-five year old son of the leader's brother was chosen as successor.

[621] The introduction of tenure changes tends to favour younger men who no longer need to defer to their elders for cash crop land. Tenure conversion at Ombi-Tara may also affect the balance of 'informal' authority in the area by altering the balance of land rights. Before conversion some individuals had rights to consider-
[556] ably larger areas of land than others. This was of some significance in determining status and prestige. Since conversion, each individual has rights to twenty acres of land. The long-term effect of this equalisation on social organisation and informal status and prestige systems may be of some significance.

[614] The functions of the clan leader are little changed by the new
[627] tenure system. As before, he has no jurisdiction over land held by individuals. He previously had limited authority to intervene if one man planted on another's land without permission and under the new system can prevent one man planting behind another's block. He is charged with preventing people from other clans or other areas planting on his clan's land in much the same way as before tenure conversion, with the difference that now his jurisdiction in this matter applies only to the clan land outside the blocks.

Obligations

571 Mutual assistance and mutual obligation patterns provide a system of social security, a form of institutional safeguard

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[1] Similar changes have been reported in another Orokaiva area by Crocombe (1966:71-2) and Hogbin (1966:81-3).

21: Belshaw E-5 (1951) 1951 QJ23 Orokaiva QJ23
Mount Lamington

discussion as to the best method of undertaking community development to meet the desires of these people. Such desires of course cannot be taken for granted, and indeed the pre-eruption history of the people led many to believe that the time is not appropriate. Certainly any grandiose schemes must wait until the people are relieved of pressing immediate worries. But at the same time there seems to be a genuine change of heart. It is true that this change of heart is accompanied by a feeling of guilt, as I have pointed out before. Yet it would be folly to ignore it.

I obtained many statements of the hopes of these people for the future. Some of them were clearly stimulated by experiences in the refugee camps. All of them contrasted their hopes for the future with their experiences of the past. Here are some that were given to me in the Popota, Hagenahambo area:

"Our lack of progress is the European's fault for not teaching us better." (This point of view was very much in the minority.)

"We get knowledge from school, but we are race people. The European taught us very well, but it is hard for us to learn because of our race. All people say there is one name in Papua, but some go their own way. Australians learn just the same but they are superior because they pull together."

"We want the white man to come and teach us, but no one teaches the Papuan very good. How can we give white people good food or furniture, because we're not taught properly? But this time the Government helps us with food. It is time for us now to try hard to learn. We want natives and white man like one family. We were very bad when the volcano blew up. But now we want to help. We want to give what we can and we want to start a new life for ourselves."

How do the people conceive of this new life? In the first place, it is to take place in a new environment, particularly with new villages and new roads as escape routes in case of a renewal of volcanic activity and as an outlet for produce. In the second place, it is to be related to the "Co-operative"; and this concept of the "Co-operative" requires a great deal of explanation.

Examination of files and interviews with the people show that the history of co-operation in the area covers the whole period following the expulsion of the Japanese[3]. It originally formed an extension of the Christian Co-operative Evangelist movement founded by the Anglican Mission, which appears to be successful in the Gona and other areas. The movement spread to the Kokoda sub-district, and to the intervening Periho group, by means of propagation by Mission teachers. Its first appearance in the Kokoda area caused some consternation in administrative circles, as the unauthorized collection of money always causes alarm. A most interesting report[4] was written by the Assistant District Officer, as a result of which

[3] "In addition to the co-operatives, numerous native commercial activities were begun by the Administration before the war. These included the compulsory planting of rubber, the trees now being tapped under contract to a European planter, and the native-owned but Administration-managed coffee plantations, of which only Sangara has recently been worked."

[4] Memo. Mr. Yeoman to District Officer September 7, 1949. "Co-operative Rumours Kokoda Sub-District."

177 Orokaiva and whites developed at Ilimo were rather unusual. He quoted other Europeans making remarks to him such as that the experience "drew us all much closer together." A planter who was helping the organisation and staying in the camp commented that the people came to talk to him far more often than before.

177 There were altogether some 14 Europeans attached to Ilimo--two
657 medical assistants, two nurses, two government teachers, one agricultural expert and the others administration workers, mission workers, etc. Mr. Kaad, though himself a Roman Catholic, made it a rule for the whole European staff, including himself, to attend the daily religious services, "to show the people we were with them." Food distributions were made daily through the village constables, blankets and medical supplies were available as needed, adult education classes were almost daily organised for both men and women, the agricultural officer demonstrated techniques and supervised the gardening programme, the Isivita people from Oro Bay were brought over to reunite families, and Kaad himself began to speak in favour of economic development in the future. Even such a bald summary indicates a far more intensive contact with Europeans at Ilimo than the Orokaiva generally experienced either before or since.

● [429] Kaad's own comments place this experience in its proper perspective. He remarked that Ilimo camp showed the government in a good light, and that people responded especially when they found that they could go back to their villages. This comment indicates that the generous gifts of the Australian government did not, by themselves, lead to a removal of the Orokaiva fears and suspicions of Orokaiva motives. One question in people's minds was whether the government, having given the food and other comforts, would now feel entitled to seize land near the volcano. It was only when this suspicion proved unfounded that relations became genuinely warm, for only then were people sure that they were not the victims of trickery.

From our own knowledge of Australian administration we can easily see that Orokaiva fears of land alienation were wholly unfounded but, on the basis of their knowledge, the Orokaiva reasoned perfectly logically.
[431] First of all, it is regular Orokaiva custom, when one makes gifts, to have in mind a claim one wishes to make for a return gift. Thus,
[423] having accepted Australian gifts, the Orokaiva were naturally anxious to find out what would be demanded in return. Furthermore, the fear that the Australians might demand land which was unoccupied and uncultivated was based on past experience and on provisions actually on the Statute Book (Native Plantation Ordinance 1925-1934, repealed in 1960). According to this ordinance, land could be alienated where there appears to be no owner and also for the purpose of "technical education of natives in agriculture." It is a matter of historical fact that the Australians acquired some choice land in the Orokaiva district under these provisions prior to the second world war. (Information: P. Sebire.)

177 If we analyse the reasons why the Australian government would
657 never have used these ordinances in the circumstances of 1951, we find
423 that these reasons lie principally in Western notions of government responsibility for victims of disasters and other values of Western Civilisation, restraining cupidity, and held more strongly that the Orokaiva, on the basis of their information, could have taken for granted. I myself found, and Mr. Sebire confirmed, that the Orokaiva even today are extremely familiar with the provisions of this old ordinance, and that they still fear it, even though it has been repealed some years ago.

177 The episode at Ilimo therefore undoubtedly did much to increase
659 confidence in Australian intentions. Mr. Kaad stated to me that
731 the main ultimate purpose of the camp administration was to teach new skills and a new way of life. Under camp conditions, there was a good opportunity to teach these new skills and put forward new ideas, but the real opportunity, he said, came later in the resettlement villages. The people at Ilimo had their world shattered and were still recovering from the shock. For that reason they could not absorb as much of what they were taught as they could have done normally.

177 After Ilimo broke up, Mr. Kaad transferred to Saiho, where the
657 new hospital was then being built and where an administrative centre was also established. (Only the Agriculture Department still operates from there today.) He attempted to develop further the new ideology he had been putting forward by contacts with the resettlement villages of Agenahambo, Koipa, Awala, Waseta, Kongohambo and Mumuni. He continued his educational, agricultural and medical programmes for some months in these villages, but he was not able to stay long. From the viewpoint of today, these programmes cannot be seen as marking a permanent change in the pattern of Orokaiva-European contacts. It would be more correct to say that the European soon became as remote as before but that the ideas promoted at Ilimo and by Mr. Kaad were later taken up by the people in the framework of organisations where direct contact with Europeans retained only a minor role.

Section 9: Contact with Americans and Returned Ancestors

829 How did Orokaiva themselves classify white people? As we have seen, they do not classify them according to the organisational role they fulfill. I also found that ethnic origin of white people is usually not a basis upon which Orokaiva will classify them. There is, however, a more esoteric basis of classification which I encountered on a number of occasions.

829 It is well known that in many parts of Melanesia, there is a
769 belief in the return of ancestors, whose skins are white, and who bring wealth and a happier dispensation to their Melanesian descendants. The Orokaiva do not appear to look upon every white man they see as a

829 returned ancestor, but have principles for distinguishing between
769 those who are and those who are not ancestors. A territorial distinction that was suggested to me was that the Northern Hemisphere is generally regarded as inhabited by spirits and ancestors. (It was an educated informant who suggested this.) Some Papuans who went to England for the Queen's coronation could not believe that the buildings, the elevators, etc., had been built by ordinary men. A parcel of clothing, taken from England by a visitor was thought of as a gift from the ancestors.

Israel, Egypt, the Red Sea and other places mentioned in the Bible are especially so regarded. One example of the sacredness ascribed to these places was evident in the reception given to a popular missionary in the Kokoda district who returned to his parish after a visit to the Holy Land. The festivities with which he was received were very much out of the ordinary, and I was told this was because the ancestors had gone to these places.

In accordance with the usual Melanesian pattern, Australia, being the country exercising political and commercial control, was excluded from the vague area to which the ancestors had supposedly gone. On the other hand, New Zealand was not necessarily regarded in the same way as Australia. A young New Zealand geographer who paid a brief visit to Mumuni (in the Sasembata district) and to myself at Sivepe had been showered with gifts and one man had pressed money upon him which he was asked to invest in New Zealand, in which case it was expected to multiply a thousandfold. The young man was prudent enough
123 to decline the offer. I do not quite know how my wife and I were
829 regarded in Sivepe, but there was evidence that the surrounding villages
769 likewise regarded us as returned ancestors; I was once drawn into a discussion with a branch of the Jegase clan group at Kiorota, four hours' walking from Sivepe, where it was known that we were living closely with the Jegase clan group. I was asked point-blank whether I belonged to the Jegase clan; later, the Sivepe people told me what the meaning of this question had been. It would seem that this identification with returned ancestors was due less to our geographical provenance than to the type of relationships we had developed with Orokaiva people; both the geographer and we were living in villages, eating with the people and sharing with them; my wife was gardening; our behaviour was not that of the taupa. To this point I shall return.

177 It must be due to reasoning of this sort that Americans were
829 placed definitely in the category of returned ancestors. I was told
769 they were very different from other taupa (or rather, they were not really taupa at all). The American forces, it will be remembered, fought the Japanese at the Kokoda Trail and drove them out of the Northern District in 1942-1943. Both they, and the Australian troops accompanying them, maintained friendly relations with the Orokaiva who helped them in various ways, supplied them with whatever food they had in return, received very generous gifts. The American soldiers ate with the Orokaiva, which Australian officials hardly ever do, and

177 fraternised with them. In fact, the friendly atmosphere created by
829 both the American and Australian troops during the war gave the Orokaiva
769 a different view of Europeans than they had before and must have greatly assisted the acceptance of the economic development ideology and local government council movement in the 1950's and 1960's. A
[415] great proportion of the cooking pots, adzes and other steel tools found in the villages today were gifts from the Americans.

769 In all the villages I visited, people listened to the news
829 broadcasts in Motu and Pidgin English; hence they heard about the Vietnam war and we discussed it a few times. The reaction was strange:
[207] it was a great pity that those American boys were being killed in
[191] Vietnam, because they were wonderful people. There was distinct disappointment that the Americans had decided to go to Vietnam instead of returning to Papua-New Guinea. Some jealousy was felt towards the Vietnamese who had now been thus favoured. I tried to assuage the disappointment felt by my informants by summarising some facts from the Manchester Guardian Weekly, my only source of knowledge at the time, but I could see that the convictions of the Orokaiva on this point were unshakable; they knew some things about the Americans which I was (or pretended to be) ignorant of.

Section 10: Self-Group Image

829 The self-group image of the Orokaiva has undergone a profound
[198] change since the war. The question that we need to investigate here is the extent to which the eruption experience affected this long-term change. The most useful procedure will therefore be, as in Section 8,
121 to set out first the present self-group image and its general development
128 over the last few decades; secondly, to place the data we have on the period immediately following the disaster in the framework of this general development.

829 Like other peoples I have personally studied (the New Zealand Maori and the Canadian Indian), the Orokaiva have been the recipients of a barrage of propaganda on the part of missionaries and government officials, who were critical of Orokaiva material standards, social customs and religious beliefs. They also supplied severe sanctions against those who did not change their material standards and customs while considerable inducements were held out to those who would. The Maori and the Blood Indians, while complying on the whole with the demands of the whites, at the same time retained a strong belief in the greatness and, often also, the superiority of their old customs. I was therefore surprised that the Orokaiva had nothing good to say about their own past, representing it as a nightmare from which they were glad to have escaped, while the teachings of the Europeans as well as their goods, provided an opportunity--the only known opportunity--for vast improvement.

829 (from the dark ages into a great future) was put on specially for
173 my benefit. When I found Orokaiva were talking to each other in precisely the same terms, I thought that this view was held perhaps principally by persons with a vested interest, such as councillors, committee, etc. However, as I stayed longer, and became somewhat more trusted, I could still find no trace of nostalgia for customs that had been abandoned. I did, of course, become aware of the deep attachment the Orokaiva have for those of their traditional customs which they still practise, and values which they still hold.

I shall quote in detail one document, a tape recorded speech
[124] made by a councillor in the Orokaiva language, which is typical of the
[126] present Christian Orokaiva self-group image. I have a number of others, consistent with this one in essence, though differing in some details to which I shall draw attention. Though Councillor Colin's speech was specially made up to be recorded by me on tape, during a session when several other recordings were made, its general tenor was no different from the speeches he interminably made at other times. The only slant that may have been unusual was the extent to which he referred to past history. I had asked, on this occasion for stories of olden times (iji matu). The councillor started with a brief sketch of the wars of his forebears; he stressed that he and his listeners were the descendants of strong fighting men who killed wayfarers as though they were dogs, and who conquered the lands of others. "Now, there is a new day, and therefore we must be united." Later, the councillor described, for my benefit, some of the traditional magic. But, he said, people did not get paid jobs, but Jesus Christ (first) gave jobs for people to take. The village constable would drag them to Kokoda in chains for having told lies, and the magicians would be put to work to stop them from being convicted. They would be fired from their jobs for idling. Such were the old days.

[177] This story stressed the most widely accepted differences between the old and the new way of life: war vs. peace, danger vs. security, division vs. unity, magic vs. Christianity, poverty vs. wealth, simplicity vs. smartness. The councillor was, in every respect, in
[625] favour of the new and opposed to the old way. He was not actually criticising the government, when referring to the activities of the
[769] village constables; nor was he criticising the village constables. On the contrary, the village constables of the early contact period are greatly revered; their names are remembered and recited in much the same way as those of other renowned ancestors. Those who were handcuffed this is the indignity remembered above all else--were lacking in smartness they just did not know the tricks for keeping out of trouble. The village constables, as I was also told at Hohorita, were the men who brought peace, who saw that people did not continue to fight each other.

At Hohorita, I had a series of discussions, at which a number of men participated, about Orokaiva history. On a number of points, which I could check, I was given reliable information. I would therefor

accept, as genuinely held by the Hohorita people at the present time, a view of history according to which the Orokaiva had only small gardens before the Europeans introduced axes and knives; it was only then that people started to make feasts, stopped eating wild fruit, etc. Here informants credited to Europeans innovations traditionally ascribed to their own culture heroes. During the same interview, I was told the people used to build houses by making a fence and putting leaves on top. The present house types, I was told, were introduced by Europeans. It so happened that this statement was substantially correct.

From these few examples (more data of the same kind could be quoted), it is already clear that the Orokaiva perceive some resemblance between the Europeans and their own culture heroes. The Orokaiva ascribe whatever cultural goods they possess to the action of culture heroes who brought them these goods in primeval time. This applies not only to material knowledge (the making of fire, houses, clothes, the growing of crops, etc.) but also to social behaviour (institutions of warfare, marriage, feasting, etc.). The Europeans manifestly brought with them innovations of the same scope. Like the culture heroes in the myths, the Europeans have many valuable new things, but they are reluctant to give them to the Orokaiva. They prefer to keep them for themselves. Occasionally, though, they do give some of them away, or are willing to trade them, or are successfully tricked into sharing them. One of the recent gifts for which the Orokaiva are especially grateful are the Local Government Councils. I asked some of the most experienced councillors whether they were able to conduct the councils according to their own ideas or were forced to follow ideas laid down by the government. I was told that the councils came "not from ourselves but from the administration. We don't know about the council. It belongs to the administration. It was given to the village people." The council was given much in the same way as fire had been given by a culture hero.

Beneficial though the Europeans undoubtedly are, they are also perceived as exasperating and dangerous: exasperating because of their refusal to share their goods, to set up proper relationships with the people and to adopt proper customs; dangerous because of the power of the police, the prisons, and--most of all--the Christian God. It is from this viewpoint that we should regard the Orokaiva interpretation of the Mount Lamington eruption as reported by Belshaw and Keesing. Belshaw reports that most Orokaiva explanations of the eruption were religious in nature: "Some people said that this was God's visitation because they had disobeyed the Bishop's instructions to build new churches. Others said that God had punished them because they had not helped the Allies sufficiently during the war and because some of them had betrayed missionaries to the Japanese . . . This sense of guilt is a most important factor in resettlement attitudes." (1951: 242) Keesing agrees with this summary, adding that the eruption resulted in "strong feelings of insecurity and even of guilt in their

177 based, is alien and seems dubious to Orokaiva. The Europeans claim
245 that a plant needs to be looked after even if it contains no spirit;
249 to the Orokaiva this appears absurd.

[824] Some Orokaiva have been employed by Europeans as carpenters; these men have certain skills upon which a community draws when large community buildings (for instance, the hospital at Sasembata mission station) need to be constructed. The trained carpenter leads such
177 enterprises in the role of expert. There was one such man in Sasembata
335 village; he, like most others of his type, learned his skill in European employment and not in one of the small adult education ventures which the administration has sponsored from time to time (the adult education classes at Ilimo camp were probably the first of this type).

177 For the rest, the skills acquired by Orokaiva over the last 15
871 years are largely concerned not directly with village development but rather with an increase of understanding of the world outside. While before the war, only a small minority had school education, the Anglican Mission spread its operations to several new stations, including Sasembata, after the war. After the eruption, the scope of education was again greatly extended and it could be said that the eruption marked the beginning of universal school education in the majority of Orokaiva villages. The Sasembata station began to draw virtually the entire child population of the surrounding villages, and most students now follow a five or six year course. While this development had been planned ever since the war, it may be significant that regular school attendance of all the villages in the district was experienced for the first time at Ilimo, where a school was conducted for the whole evacuee child population, and adult classes as well. It is the objective of present school programmes, as far as I can see, to make the population literate and the increase of

[212] literacy is a major aspect of acculturation over the period. Literacy has certainly progressed to a point where letters written in Orokaiva to any family in Sivepe can be read and understood with the help of at least a junior member of the family; and can be replied to. While
177 I could see no evidence that people have acquired mathematical knowledge
802 of any sophistication, I was struck by a strong quantitative orientation. In the Orokaiva language, there are no numerals higher than 2; hence, it is the invariable practise to use English numerals when speaking

[192] the Orokaiva language. The numerals are, in fact, among the main English linguistic features that have been borrowed. They are used with remarkable frequency; the number of coffee trees, the value in pounds of trade goods included in a bride price, the calculation of money prices, even the number of brothers or men who together played some role in a mythological tale (a distinctly contemporary touch, this)--all these phenomena show that "numbers" have become an integral part of Orokaiva culture. The Orokaiva use the English word "number"
177 for a variety of quantitative concepts, including price. Finally, one
829 must regard as an aspect of acculturation, the introduction of many

177 concepts drawn from the scene of world affairs. While among the
829 Orokaiva, I heard talk about Vietnam, Indonesia, Africa, India. The
political orientation displayed was a mild kind of nationalism, and
[203] a sense of closeness to newly independent non-white states. But the
information, derived from radio broadcasts and speeches by councillors,
introduced an acculturative kind of perspective. Its dissemination is
being actively encouraged by the Australian authorities.

465 Use of money: Before the eruption, money played a very minor role
in village life. It was earned by men who were away for limited
[464] periods working on plantations. Money wages on plantations were, and
are, extremely low; wages for agreement labour in 1962 were, for
instance, $39 per annum for the first year of which $12 is paid out
in monthly installments and the rest at the end of the year. In the
second year, the rate rose to $45.50 p.a. (Howlett, 1965) Urban wages
are a great deal higher than this; most Sivepe men who were absent
on employment worked on urban jobs. At the same time, a regular
income was derived from coffee.

464 Sivepe men were simply not interested in jobs at plantation
rates of pay, nor were they interested in "carrying" jobs for the
435 government even though wages in that case were higher. They were also
438 indifferent to selling their garden products on the Saiho and Popondetta
markets, as there were frequent gluts, prices were low and carrying
goods to market was an unduly arduous task.

436 Money was used largely to buy goods in the luxury rather than
the subsistence sphere. Money was essential for payment of taxes
511 and for a minimum of clothes, often acquired cheaply at jumble sales.
Otherwise, it was used to buy tobacco, food for feasts, kerosene
mainly used for feasting occasions, cartridges for hunting, again for
feasts. Among the larger purchases made were radios, pressure lamps,
bicycles, tools; all these, however, could never be paid for with
current income. One had to depend on special windfalls: a gift from
459 a relative in town, a bride price. Money was not only for spending,
556 however; it was also for saving. I shall refer to the organisation
of corporate saving later; in addition a number of Sivepe men had
savings, of the order of $10-$20, sometimes more, hidden away. This
money was kept for special occasions, but in addition, the very fact
of possessing it was regarded as important. I was once told that
Europeans were powerful because they had money; the Orokaiva could
get power only if they too possessed savings.

436 If money was definitely highly valued, it was only to a limited
437 extent regarded as a standard of value. If we accept some model such
as was suggested by Salisbury (1962), we may say that the Orokaiva
have three spheres of exchange: a subsistence, luxury and ritual
sphere, while bank notes are used for special, often ritual occasions.
[461] In the acquisition of luxury goods of any kind, including money, the
Orokaiva tend to weigh the benefits gained by them against their cost
in time and unpleasantness and against the benefits that can be gained
from other investments. Money is, in general, wanted only if it can

474 share to the owner of the land. This activity started some time after
177 1947 and ceased with the eruption of Mount Lamington. It involved
241 "everybody" at Pamba. At Inonda, both rice and peanuts were tried out. The rice was planted in one block, without subdivisions; it was hulled and sold at Higaturu government station, the money was distributed. There were two harvests between the time people started to grow rice and the time of the eruption, when rice was abandoned. Proceeds were 18 pounds and nine pounds; people's shares were two to three pounds each. The mission had nothing to do with the activity, but only the government, so I was told.

The evidence, limited as it is, leads one to wonder whether the rice produced by the cooperatives was really unsaleable, as Dakeyne suggests (1966: 61-62). On the other hand, there is no doubt that the mission lacked any marketing facilities and I would strongly agree with Dakeyne that the cooperative movement could never have succeeded except on the basis of cash sales for good prices. Sivepe, acting under mission influence, ate their own rice and did not attempt to sell it. When the people came back after the eruption, the rice was "spoiled," the deacon had been transferred to another station. In Inonda, the crop had likewise been "spoiled." Dakeyne reports that in 1951, the rice was attacked by a species of "army worm;" the District Agricultural Officer ordered all crops destroyed.

474 The pattern of production of the Sivepe rice resembles that
241 of the communal yam gardens. There also, several men may plant together in the garden of one of them; the users are then expected
[427] to make a gift of yams to the owner before taking away their own. If we put this strictly in contractual terms, a man leases land to others for one year for a fee. The lessees, together with the owner (who retains one section for himself), club together as a kind of working bee for the planting and harvesting (and perhaps some other operations). This traditional pattern was revived after the eruption in the establishment of coffee and rubber stands. Its significance, however, is somewhat changed if such common cultivations are carried on not for the sake of growing food for feasts (such as the yams), but for cash (as in the case of rubber and coffee and perhaps rice). When a common plot is established for cash crops (but not yams), the Sasembata district people call this a "company;" they speak of "company land"--the word "company" being a borrowed English word incorporated in Orokaiva vocabulary. This word has mildly millennial overtones: a "company" is the means by which the Orokaiva may acquire wealth equal to that of
● [829] the Europeans. It would be unfair to say, with Kleekham, that the "company" of the Orokaiva is a mystical and magical device; it is in fact a representation of what Orokaiva believe European business to be like.

471 Today, Sivepe has three forms of economic organisation. The
[596] dominant one is that where the factors of production are entirely provided by the extended family and where the product is appropriated by the extended family also. This sytem applies to subsistence as

652 expected to levy. He wrote his Bishop that he would not collect the
871 tax. His letter seems to have been only one trickle in a river of non-cooperation and I never found out whether the government prevailed over the missions.

871 This controversy casts some light on Orokaiva attitudes to education. By standards of Orokaiva wealth, parents are making a
[431] major voluntary contribution in money, labour and materials, not with the idea of "paying for their children's eduction," but in order to make appropriate return gifts for the services rendered by the mission. The principle governing this transaction is reciprocity, but not contract. Thus, the Orokaiva contribution to their children's education differs from a tax in three crucial ways:

(a) It is specifically given to the mission, towards whom the people feel an obligation and not to the government, to which they do not feel beholden for their children's education. (This obstacle could be overcome only if the government succeeded in explaining the Department of Education budget in the villages.)

(b) It is regarded as voluntary, according to the principle
[558] of reciprocity. People contribute from goodwill and generosity, the only possible sanction for a non-contributor being a diminution of social status. (If an education tax is levied, the sanction is refusal to admit children to schools. This rule already applies in administration schools.)

(c) Contributions are made only partly in cash, but consist mainly of labour and materials which are not readily marketable in the villages. (If the payment is entirely in cash, this cash has to be earned outside the village or by cash-cropping. Resources such as sago and blackpalm cannot be used as a contribution to education.)

I have shown at various points in this report that Orokaiva value their children's school education highly. In Sasembata district, the men worked for the mission long before anyone was baptised and their motive was, as they told me, to see that their children could
●[829] go to school. When I asked why they wished this, they answered that this was the only chance for the children to be able to obtain the same wealth as the Europeans and become equally powerful. It is consistent with this reasoning that the Orokaiva have never been very disturbed by what may seem to us the strange policy of conducting lessons in the English language. It has so far been enough for the Orokaiva to see that the only Papuans who have obtained wealth and power have been those who were educated in the school and who have
[191] gained some knowledge of English. It is only among the educated Orokaiva that one hears arguments for the Papuans and New Guineans being educated in a language of their own.

Section 5: Attitudes Towards Government

829 Orokaiva attitudes towards the government have three aspects
563 that must be carefully distinguished: attitudes to individual government servants, to the power structure and to the values represented by the government. As for attitudes to individual public servants, I have no evidence for any change in attitudes. In a subtle way every white man with whom Orokaiva come into contact is tested according to various criteria: fairness, courtesy, willingness to reciprocate gifts and services, willingness to eat with the people (a rare phenomenon, this) and above all, his behaviour in the constant battle of wits and inner strength in which Orokaiva delight. A man such as Mr. Kaad who was a good man by all these tests, was remembered with much affection; others, though excellent by the criteria of the Australian public service, would be resented or soon forgotten.

657 The Orokaiva attitude to the power structure is determined by
177 a rather harsh history of earlier contacts, beginning with the murderous régime of Monckton and culminating in the 1940's in the Japanese conquest, the Allied re-conquest and the public execution of a small band of Orokaiva who had sided with the Japanese. The welfare orientation of the Australian government was perhaps never massively demonstrated before the eruption of Mount Lamington. At the present time this welfare orientation is well understood but the Orokaiva fear the Australian power to compel their compliance. They use what resources they have to keep this power within limits. They have found that it is usually fruitless to disobey Australian commands openly, but power can often be made ineffective if orders are misunderstood or forgotten or evaded. Furthermore, it is a general rule among Orokaiva to withhold information systematically from the kaupa. It took me some months to learn that even the simplest information I had about the Orokaiva was often unknown to Europeans, not because they were not interested but because nobody would tell them. On a few occasions when an official asked me a question I would say that any of his "driver-boys" (that was how they referred to their drivers) could answer it and the official would answer: "Nobody will tell me. They all say they don't know." This is indeed a potent weapon against colonial administrators.

657 It would be wrong to assume that this attitude is directed
177 against Europeans in general, because there was great variation in the treatment of individuals, and also, it is not directed against the values Australians are trying to introduce. The avoidance of communication is largely, I think, a device in the power struggle between the colonial government and its subjects. The Orokaiva do what they can to avoid being dominated. In this context, the setting
[623] up of local government councils was a great step forwards. The councillors do not meet with the same communication bar because the people know that they can control them through the electoral machinery. Hence it

875 Australia, enough of contemporary thought in literature, art and allied
657 subjects and enough general sophistication to fit only with difficulty in the society of missionaries, planters and officials. At the same time he was drawn to these groups because of his feeling that by coming to New Guinea he had joined the "have's" and left the "have-nots" behind. Though his bohemian background made him critical towards the colonial attitude to Papuans, he faced a difficult problem in working out his own. Both his own ambition and his wife's background (closer to the mission norm) predisposed him to avoid identification with the Papuans. On the other hand, when I met him, he still felt a little uneasy at playing the pukka sahib role which was certainly a betrayal of earlier principles. He was beginning to run into some difficulties with Papuans on the mission station and in the villages. During the year of our presence in Sivepe, he found what seemed an excellent solution by being elected a member of the Higaturu Local Government Council.

649 Though membership is open to persons of any ethnic group, it
666 seemed at first as though Orokaiva would not vote for an Australian candidate. After all, they are well aware of the dangers of having their local affairs controlled by foreigners. But as the election
[123] approached, attitudes changed. Quite early, they had asked me to stand, but I excused myself as I would not be staying long enough. A little later, the mission teacher heard that if he offered himself, he would get some support. He went to the villages of his ward on an electioneering tour and defeated the sitting member with a comfortable majority.
[829] The motive of the electors, as I was told, was that this energetic young white man would be a good champion for Sasembata causes in a council which, in pragmatic terms, was still largely dominated by an Australian advisor. Furthermore, Orokaiva were well aware that their own power over the mission teacher had increased considerably since he depended on them for elective office. He and his wife could no longer treat any callers in an offhand fashion, for were they not also voters?

Section 2: Papuans from Other Districts

177 In our discussion of expatriates, we have shown that some kind of identification with Papuan values occurred in many of the most influential; this identification could either be positive, when the expatriate identified himself with the interests of the Orokaiva, or negative, when the expatriate used procedures not acceptable in his country of origin but effective in furthering his own interests in opposition to Orokaiva. For the Papuans, employed as pastors or in similar roles, and therefore resident among a strange tribe, the position was more complicated. Such a Papuan was not principally a mediator between his own indigenous culture and that of his new

159 external representation of Sivepe was at stake, the two men worked together admirably as a team. Lawrence solved the tricky problems of partitioning blocks shared between villages with a speed which would make any surveyor envious, and got agreement from the other parties because the solutions he proposed seemed fair. Robert carried out his own function of seeing that the working parties came together, that the clearing work was done for the survey posts, and so on. However, when I took them both to Popondetta in my car, they had very little to say to each other. When I told Lawrence who his companion was to be, he gave me a look of mock despair. (He had a different look of mock despair for my use of the Orokaiva language.)

[829] Robert was more deeply involved with mission values than any of the others. He was the only one to have recognised that our [126] civilisation actually does have some moral values. I recorded stories [124] from a great many informants on tape--the subjects being usually selected by the informant for these longer texts. Robert was the only one to have chosen themes overtly showing a mission influence: one story was about a Father Holland who was betrayed to the Japanese by Orokaiva during the war; the other story was his own version of Adam and Eve and the Fall, to which he gave a splendid Orokaiva twist: God, dismissing the couple from the Garden of Eden, said: "For a long time you will have sorrowful days and be sad, but also you will have happy days and be happy. Thus he spoke and all of us today live in this manner."

571 To conclude these impressionistic sketches, I shall suggest a
157 contrast between the leadership of Sivepe and Inonda. When we consider the two men just described, or Samuel, the village constable, Robert's father and the councillor, an immigrant from Binduta, we notice that none of them stood out from the rest of the village by superior wealth. Certainly, Robert's father once gave a big feast in Sivepe; he had some savings and gave another small feast while I was in the village, but he stood out mainly in virtue of his role and his personality. The councillor was a consummate actor who exuded a great air of authority while he was in the council. But in Inonda, the village constable, Oriri, was at the same time an entrepreneur, the first cash cropper. He was also the occupier of a strikingly larger area of land than anyone else had. His son, Stephen, the driver, likewise was very much an entrepreneur, both in his cash-cropping ventures and in his attempt at a trade store, at trading in coffee, in vegetables and lately, his application for a loan to start a cattle farm. He is not intending to do the farming himself, but wants to have a younger brother-in-law trained, and he is to work under Stephen's supervision.

Both Stephen and Oriri still continue their interest in traditional observances. The father, who lives on a returned servicemen's section where he grows cocoa, came back to his home village to act as feast leader in 1967. This was very much a traditional affair, with a proper feast house, a ceremony to call down the spirits, chants and dances for the spirits for several weeks, something Sivepe would

the assumption is that such events are read by a social group as constituting a sign or system of signs.[1]

Such an assumption is legitimate in the case of the eruption of Mount Lamington. In the view of the great majority of my Orokaiva informants, the cataclysmic explosions in the mountain and related volcanic activity were utterances communicating a message. With unimportant exceptions to which I shall refer later, informants took what may be called a religious view of the eruption (Lévi-Strauss 1962:292). They invested with personal will what we would call forces of nature (van der Leeuw 1938:chap. 9). And not only did some Being cause the eruption, but he used it as a means of communication.

Whether it is expedient to study a cataclysm such as the eruption of Mount Lamington as a system of signs emitted by the mountain depends entirely on the quality of the insights that emerge. In this case, field inquiry showed the existence of at least four systems of thought on the significance of the disaster. The adherents of these systems each expressed a different world view consistent with their view of the eruption. The existence of such ideological differences within a single society reflects conflicts which occur not only on the level of discourse but also on that of social transactions.

Such data raise several questions that merit close examination. If all Orokaiva had placed the eruption within one logically consistent framework of meaning, we might believe that we had thus discovered *the* cognitive system of the Orokaiva. In the present case we find four ideologies and explanatory frameworks all generated by the same cognitive system, in the same way that different players may use a variety of strategies while competing with one another in the same game. It then becomes our task to reconstruct this cognitive system and account for a system of interrelated ideologies generated by a sequence of events as interpreted by the cognitive system.

Another question is whether ideological discourse about the cause of the eruption deals with all or some or any of the basic conflicts identified in the society by ethnographic study and analysis. My data, dealing with the period 1951–1966, suggest that Orokaiva ideological discourse was rather selective in the conflicts with which it concerned itself. The conflicts between tribalism and regionalism and between denial and acceptance of the

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partnership with European power are fully canvassed, but conflicts arising out of the relocation of refugees after the eruption and conflicts concerning land tenure are not reflected in ideological discourse related to the disaster. How can we explain this selectiveness?

We may finally ask: To what extent have signs communicated by the eruption become an integral part of the Orokaiva system of thought in 1966? To what extent do they appear in the rhetoric expressing current ideologies? To what extent has the eruption generated these ideologies? How do cognitive systems adapt themselves to far-reaching events (such as the establishment of Australian authority) which call into question the traditional rationale for behavior? In short, the Orokaiva data lead us to an exploration of the dynamics of non-Western thought.

The factual material presented here corresponds closely to the preoccupations agreed on by the contributors to this volume. I commence with the presentation of some background data, emphasizing institutional, transactional, and ecological factors. The semiotic analysis that follows is focused on crisis behavior. The analysis will bring to light conflicts in two areas which are of special concern in comparative study of exile and migration in Oceania: the macrosystem/microsystem relationship and the maintenance of ethnic boundaries.

My discussion of land tenure conflicts, ignored in the ideological discourse under examination, will deal with the cultural meaning of spatial movement and the significance of land at various levels of culture. It will be demonstrated that although land tenure does not figure in ideological discourse about the eruption directly, it is integrated into ideological discourse indirectly.

The use of semiotics in anthropological analysis is at an early stage of development. Among the well-known pioneers in America are Bateson (1935, 1951), Mead (1964), Sebeok (1970), and sources such as E. T. Hall, Alfred Hayes, and Weston LaBarre. In this chapter, I have relied a great deal on the work of Lévi-Strauss (especially 1958, 1960, 1962), whose semiotics forms an integral part of his structural comparative method.

Semiotics has inevitably drawn extensively on linguistic concepts, since linguists have traditionally engaged in sophisticated analyses of symbols. The present chapter owes a debt to Saussure, to Hjelmslev, and especially to Barthes (1964a, 1964b). I would

only with reference to a quite novel form of infringement of the taboo—a far more offensive infringement than had ever happened before. Just what made grenades and guns so offensive?

This question may be answered on several levels. The first of these is a purely ritual level. Of all the novel activities in which the Orokaiva engaged near the mountain, the ones that were singled out as significant stood out by making a sharp, loud, and dangerous noise. Now there are many ritual contexts where the Orokaiva use silence as a sign of respect and noise as a sign of disrespect. Hence the Orokaiva were ritually consistent when they told me it was the noise of the hunters' guns that angered Sumbiripa. But hunting rifles have a further symbolic significance that should be taken into account. I was told that game on the mountain was plentiful until the guns were introduced but that today hardly any game is left because the guns killed it all. In this instance the Orokaiva were giving a very reasonable explanation of a drop in game population which was probably real enough. In fact everybody uses guns today or wants to use them, as they are effective for hunting. But they are also sinister—that is, their effectiveness is known to be too great to allow the game population to survive.

The young men who took up the use of hunting rifles between the end of World War II and the time of the eruption were bold innovators and at the same time they were considered slightly wicked in abandoning traditional hunting methods. This is implied by informants who account for the eruption by the anger of Sumbiripa. They are thinking of the breakdown of the old order by the adoption of European innovations, Sumbiripa representing the potency of the old order. They argue that if only the young men had not started to use hunting rifles, the disaster would not have happened. The young men would never have dared to make such a din close to the crater if their respect for the spirits had not been undermined by newfangled doctrines.

The explanation of the disaster considered here resembles all other recorded explanations in one fundamental respect: it is not merely the application of a traditional rule to a new event but it generates a new rule, justifies the rule in the light of empirical evidence, and can be comprehended only in the framework of an ideology which in turn was generated by contemporary events. The starting point of all the explanations is the activity of white officials, missionaries, and traders among the Orokaiva and the

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innovations they have brought. Those who blame the eruption on the anger of Sumbiripa regard these innovations as potentially disastrous. They argue that the eruption has proved their point; it has fortified them in their ideology. Furthermore, they have established the rule that people should not shoot on the mountain. Before the eruption this was not, to my knowledge, clearly formulated as a ritual prohibition. Today it is clearly stated though generally disregarded for reasons we shall soon learn. In justification of the rule, it should be noted that it is supported by some very cogent evidence from Sivepe villagers. It is a fact that while the eruption killed nearly all the Sangara it killed very few people of Isivita and the Sasembata districts, even though they live equally close to the crater. It is also a fact that while the Sangara had many hunting rifles in the late 1940s, the Isivita and the Sasembata districts then had few or none. I was told that Sumbiripa gave two signs just before the eruption. To the Isivita people and those of Sasembata district he made a sign of blue fire, which meant they would be saved. To the Sangara people he gave a sign of red fire, which meant they would all die.

We note that this way of explaining the disaster is concerned with a precontact social macrosystem comprising two allied groups, the Sasembata and Isivita, and their traditional enemies, the Sangara. It is not concerned with the contemporary macrosystem which is the system of relations holding between Papuans, the government, and the mission. Neither the government nor the mission enters into the explanation. Furthermore, the explanation emphasizes the tribal boundary between the Sangara people and those designated as the Waseta tribe by Williams (1940).[14] It is, in fact, the opposition between Sangara and Waseta that is stressed by this explanation.

It is precisely this opposition that makes clear the strategic and manipulative nature of the argument. Waseta are using the occasion of the eruption to score a point against their old rivals and enemies the Sangara, who deserved to be punished as retribution for earlier acts of war. The explanation ignores the fact that ninety-two Waseta also were killed in the disaster.

At this point we recognize the explanation as part of a connotative system. Any reasonable explanation of the disaster would account for all the deaths. The division of the dead into tribal or ethnic groups is logically insignificant. In a connotative system,

significance is assigned to this distinction for the purpose of stating some ideology.

Barthes (1964a) points out that in a connotative system the level of expression is "rhetoric" and the level of content is "ideology." This seems to describe the pattern accurately enough. The present explanation may be reduced to a rhetoric or moralistic vilification expressing a tribalist Waseta ideology. The rhetorical aspect is clear because in actual fact both tribes hunted on the mountain though only one was hit seriously by the disaster.

I now turn to a second explanation which deals with Orokaiva, though we have very few data on its currency among them. The explanation is contained in a report (undated but probably written shortly after the eruption) from Fred Kleekham, district agricultural officer, Popondetta, in which he describes a mission-sponsored "Christian Cooperative." This cooperative flourished among the Yega at that time where, in Kleekham's opinion, it "did indeed become a cult." Kleekham reports that members of the cult refused to have their rice hulled or bought by the government and that this was due to "some mystical element . . . involved in rice marketing." He continues:

> I think that more influential than the thought that Europeans would leave Papua as a result of cooperatives was the belief that the formation of and participation in cooperatives would—magically or mystically—in short time raise the native to the status of the European in all respects. . . . I am sure that this movement owed much to hanging of Orokaivas judged responsible for the murder of missionaries and the former officer in charge of the coffee project.
>
> It is interesting to recall that one group was prepared to do *anything* under European guidance to get money. Their message was "show us how to get the money to buy the guns." Later the Lamington eruption which obliterated the government station at Higaturu was regarded by many as payback for the hangings.

There is no evidence that this explanation of the disaster was ever held by any Orokaiva. It is more than probable that this explanation is that of the Yega, who are traditional exchange partners of the Orokaiva and enemies of the Sangara. It is among the Yega that Kleekham worked, and I am inclined to believe that the Yega widely accepted the views he reported. This would fit the facts as we know them. Certainly we should not expect the Orokaiva to explain the disaster by a theory which accounts only for

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eruption met their fate on the very same spot (Higaturu) where the executions took place some years earlier.

I include the Yega explanation in this study because it influenced the total regional communication system from which the Orokaiva derive their basic concepts. What is this regional system? It is certainly not a postcontact introduction, yet it has a very different significance now as compared to the last century.

Williams (1940, n.d.) shows that the external boundaries of the human race, as defined in Orokaiva myths, take in most of the population of the Northern District of Papua but do not extend beyond the Northern District. Internal boundaries drawn in the myths separate this population into a number of mutually hostile language groups, each specializing in the production or supply of certain distinctive products. It was an integral part of Orokaiva social thought to hold that permanent peace was impossible between the groups thus separated, although a truce was occasionally established and trade and intermarriage were regular occurrences. In this respect, the Cargo Cults of the early postcontact period (the Baigona Cult in 1912 and the Taro Cult in 1914) marked a radical innovation. The chief social message, especially of the Taro Cult, was that villages and tribes hitherto divided by strife should be united in brotherhood. The cult taught that the traditional tribal boundaries should be disregarded and all Papuans of the region were one people. This idea started in the coastal region but soon spread from there to Orokaiva territory (see Chinnery and Haddon 1917; Williams 1928).

At the time of the eruption, the coastal people were again involved in a millennial movement, the Christian Cooperative, which was spreading throughout the Orokaiva tribes. While tribal boundaries were a source of anxiety in all the evacuation camps (though the anxiety was more acute among Sangara relocated on the coast than among Orokaiva relocated at Ilimo), the possibility of a further development of the Christian Cooperative was still open, and this would have involved general acceptance of the Yega explanation of the disaster.

Comparing the Orokaiva and Yega explanations, we note that the cause of the eruption in both cases is the anger of Sunbiripa, although the Yega explanation is not entirely explicit on this point. Furthermore, both explanations take a rather negative view of European power—one by ignoring it, the other by making it the ob-

731 ject of the wrath of the mountain. There are, however, two inter-
184 esting differences. The first is that in the Orokaiva explanation we
find an opposition between two tribes (Waseta innocent; Sangara
829 guilty). In the Yega explanation we find an opposition between
ethnic groups (Papuans of the Northern District innocent; Euro-
peans guilty). This classing together of the Papuans of an entire
region is a departure from traditional tribalism. It reflects an
ideology aimed at maximizing indigenous power by the establish-
ment of an intertribal regional coalition.

731 The second difference lies in the role of Sumbiripa (or whoever
184 the angry deity was) in the two explanations. In the Orokaiva ver-
sion, the transgression was against the sacred domain of Sum-
784 biripa and thus of a familiar traditional type. In the Yega version,
the punishing God assumes a strangely political role in taking the
side of the Papuans against their enemies, the whites. The crime of
the whites admittedly took place near the mountain, though not in
the sacred domain. Sumbiripa was never, in any other context, de-
scribed as a general defender or avenger in support of "his" peo-
ple. Indeed he seems to be playing a somewhat Jehovah-like role in
this tale. We are here in the sphere of the Cargo Cults or millennial
movements rather than in that of traditional Melanesian religion.

Meanwhile no mention is made of the 3,500 Sangara who died in the disaster. This would have weakened the argument, for any reference to the Sangara victims might have suggested that they too were worthy of punishment. Though the Yega probably do think so, it would not have been expedient to say so when an intertribal alliance was contemplated. Here we are obviously closer to ideological rhetoric than to philosophical speculation.

731 The third explanation of the disaster is the one that has at-
784 tracted the most attention by previous writers. Belshaw, who met
797 Orokaiva survivors a few weeks after the eruption, records the fol-
184 lowing observations (1951:242):

> Some people said that this was God's visitation because they had disobeyed the Bishop's instructions to build new churches. Others said that God had punished them because they had not helped the Allies sufficiently during the war and because some of them betrayed missionaries to the Japanese. [Others again mentioned] lack of cooperation in Mission and Government plans for development. . . . This sense of guilt is a most important factor in resettlement attitudes.

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cism from white planters and public servants that the church, by preaching that the eruption was due to God's wrath, is pursuing obscurantist and reprehensible power politics. Orokaiva informants who adopted the geophysical explanation said that before the eruption they did not know about volcanoes but have now learned from the white man that a volcano operates according to certain natural laws.[15]

There is no magico-religious Orokaiva metalanguage in which this explanation can be expressed. On the other hand, its connotation is clear. The explanation marks an informant as highly educated, free of superstition, and a good friend of the whites (including the anthropologist). The explanation connotes that magico-religious theories are old-fashioned and geophysical theories are modern. It divides the social universe into old-fashioned people (whose views have become irrelevant) and modern people (who include the Europeans and a Papuan elite who befriend them). Such a division vitiates the regional unity envisaged by the Yega and Christian explanations.

The connotations of the four explanations I have presented can thus be expressed in a simple model based on two highly significant oppositions which arise in the macrosystem of the Northern District and in the changing system of ethnic boundary maintenance.[16] The first opposition is between refusal and acceptance of a relation of positive reciprocity with Europeans. The second opposition is between tribalism and ideologies envisaging the unity of the Papuan tribes of the region.

Connotation	Explanation			
	Waseta	Yega	Christian	Geophysical
Rejection (−)/acceptance (+) of Europeans	−	−	+	+
Absence (−)/presence (+) of regionalism	−	+	+	−

ANALYSIS OF THE METALANGUAGES

Our next task is to analyze the evidence for Orokaiva systems of thought in which notions like 'the anger of Sumbiripa' and 'the anger of God' become fully comprehensible. We shall soon find

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that instead of timeless constructs of primitive philosophers we are occupied with a series of historical events both before and after the eruption, all of which became signs much in the same way as the eruption; the explanation will take the form of the tracing of associations between these signs. There are, however, some stable principles governing these connections. We turn to these first.

I have argued elsewhere that the social structure of the Orokaiva is characterized by a weak patrilineality with small corporate groups but that exchange transactions between these groups are, in many respects, highly structured (Schwimmer 1970a, n.d.). These exchanges follow rules which are justified by an elaborate system of thought arising out of the principle that gift making is the source of social potency and exchange is the measure of that potency. Such a system, by its very nature, makes no assumptions about the permanency of social associations, as it is only the success of exchange transactions that allows associations (outside the small corporate groups) to endure. Decisions about the upkeep of particular associations are of necessity determined by criteria of allocation. According to Orokaiva ideas, associations go through alternating periods of positive reciprocity (friendship) and negative reciprocity (war). Whereas in Western thought permanence is considered normal and quarrels a deviation from the norm, the Orokaiva do not envisage either friendship or enmity as permanent states but rather as alternating temporary states.

The implication of this philosophy for social relations (and this includes Orokaiva-white relations) is that they never are what a Westerner would call "friendly" or "hostile." It would be more correct to say that at any given time they may be going through a positive (friendly) or negative (hostile) cycle. Movements from positive to negative cycles tend to be gradual, since in the Orokaiva view social relations tend to deteriorate constantly, little by little, until they become hostile. On the other hand, movements from negative to positive cycles tend to be highly dramatic and ritualized—usually through reconciliation feasts and gifts. In relations with Europeans, reconciliations are harder to effect since there is no commensality between the ethnic groups.

If it is natural for social relations to deteriorate constantly and gradually, it is still possible to decide that one will allow an association to deteriorate before one takes active steps to restore it. Such a choice is determined by many factors: intrinsic attraction

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829 511 felt toward the exchange partner, fear of the trouble he might cause, instrumental benefits he has to offer, the importance of the partner in the total exchange network, and so on.

[519] Anger, in this Orokaiva philosophy, is a normal attitude toward a partner with whom one stands, for the time being, in a relation of negative reciprocity. An exchange of injuries takes place until peace is made by the offer of an appropriate gift and feast. The anger of Sumbiripa does not completely fall into this pattern because here the exchange relationship is somewhat limited in scope. Sumbiripa's gift to man is the safe confinement of the dead, whereas man's gift is merely the avoidance of any disturbance of Sumbiripa's mountain. Man mediates the relationship by sending his dead to Sumbiripa; Sumbiripa mediates it by emitting his usually innocuous rumbling. Before 1951, Sumbiripa was not known by Orokaiva to have ever erupted. Hunting on the mountain and similar infractions were believed to have broken the exchange relationship and thus aroused Sumbiripa to a just reprisal.

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Sumbiripa's anger was righteous not only because he was a god. In the framework of Orokaiva thought, serious anger is normally regarded as righteous, at least among persons standing in a regular exchange relationship. If anger expresses itself in verbal abuse or physical violence it is not serious, but it becomes so if misfortunes occur because of sorcery imputed to the person who is wronged. The successful magical expression of anger proves that anger to be well founded. A man may of course decide to use countermagic, and if that works the anger is no longer serious. If countermagic does not work, a man must be ready to acknowledge his fault and make reparations.

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In such a dispute it is of course relevant which side has broken a rule, but the rules are most often debatable. In the end nothing is considered worse than to have made another person seriously angry. Prudence demands that seriously angry persons should be mollified, unless their kinship and physical distance is such that they can be defined as enemies. But even between enemies, a time comes when anger is shown by magical and other misfortunes to become inexpedient.

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Self-accusation and self-inflicted injury are a regular part of this system. In order to make peace a person must define himself as the transgressor (Schwimmer 1970a, n.d.), as the Papuans did in the 'anger of God' explanation. Self-injury is a regular strategic

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weapon, since the person who cuts down his own tree to injure himself shows anger about a hostile act perpetrated by some unnamed person. He thus makes a claim for community sympathy and possible restitution (Williams 1940). Self-accusation is a form of self-injury and therefore at once places an obligation on the *sufferer* of the supposed original injury. In this sense an acknowledgment of guilt by Orokaiva would place some obligation on Sumbiripa or God to forgive them. Thus we can never ignore the transactional element in what is manifestly a sincere state of contrition.

It is far more complicated to explain the anger of the Christian God, and people's belief in it, than to explain the anger of Sumbiripa. At the time of the eruption, few Orokaiva had been baptized, whereas it was precisely in Sangara territory that the mission was well established and had many adherents. Most of the persons who thought they had been punished by God were actually still pagan, which strictly should have put them out of reach of his wrath. We need to reconstruct as best we can what kind of exchange relationship was deemed to exist in 1951.

We can appraise this only if we consider briefly the total system of relationships of the Orokaiva within the colonial macrosystem, namely the social unit comprising Orokaiva, mission, government, and traders. Theories about the punishment of God referred not only to Orokaiva neglect of the mission but also neglect of instructions and advice given by the government. The traders were never mentioned.

One common characteristic of government and mission is that both institutions believe they are the Papuans' benefactors and say so on many occasions. In particular, it is on these supposed benefits that they base any moral claims they make on the Orokaiva. When the eruption occurred it was therefore reasonable, from the Orokaiva viewpoint, to conclude that their slowness in satisfying the claims of government and mission had aroused in them great anger and that God, who manifestly was looking after the white authorities, acted as agent of the punishment.

In exchange relations it is a fixed policy to satisfy the claims of important partners first and be much slower about the others. The fact that the whites, in spite of their immense wealth, had a fairly low partnership ranking is not difficult to explain. If we glance at the kind of interaction typical of the years 1900 to 1950, we find

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that the European exchange partner did not have a great deal to offer the Orokaiva, because not even money was essential. Conversely, the fear of the trouble the white man might cause was not so great as one might suppose. Certainly, there were horrifying stories about what the white man might do if angered, but the Orokaiva had since learned some simple rules telling them how such anger could be most conveniently evaded.

Until World War II, the relationship between the Orokaiva and the government followed this general pattern almost entirely. The government made the regulations and the Orokaiva did the unavoidable minimum. World War II began to change the pattern of this partnership. Australian and American soldiers moved into the Northern District to drive out the Japanese. They camped in the bush, they shared their food with the Orokaiva, they accepted Orokaiva hospitality, they generously distributed what supplies they had to spare. The white soldier, unlike the civilian, lived in a style much closer to what the Orokaiva consider human. He laughed and joked in the presence of the Orokaiva; he put on no colonial pretense.

After the war, the Australian government changed its policy in the territory, suppressing corporal punishment of employees, emphasizing economic development in the villages, improving schooling, introducing local self-government on a limited scale (and later political representation in the House of Assembly), offering Papuans jobs of some responsibility, and discontinuing the type of village policing that made all reforms dependent on the enforcement of regulations. The village constables, whose job was in practice confined to reporting infractions of the regulations, were replaced by elected officials (local government councillors) who are indoctrinators rather than policemen. They harangue the people with a diffuse message covering a wide area of social and economic development. They seek to secure acceptance for new ideas, so that people will genuinely believe in the usefulness of changes they are making.

When I visited the Orokaiva in 1966–1967, I found a great deal of ideological discussion, the key concept being *iji eha* ('the new day, the new age')—a new way of life based on the economics of coffee growing and wage earning, the social amenities of improved villages, school education, Christianity, avoidance of violence, and, generally, cooperation with the mission and administration. I

I was amazed to see how closely the councillors' harangues and other speechmaking in the villages corresponded to official policies. Many of the advocated ideas were not being put into practice, but generally the transition seemed rather smooth. There were conflicts between the Orokaiva and their mentors, in some instances irreconcilable ones, but it seemed that consideration of these conflicts was being deferred because there was evidence of steady improvement, as long as coffee prices would only keep rising.

Informants, when asked when the 'new age' had started, all replied that it was after the Japanese were driven out. The eruption was never mentioned as the beginning of the 'new age'. It was after the war that the money economy became important and men began to take jobs outside the village for protracted periods. It was then that money became a necessary part of bridewealth so that, as an initiatory ritual, every young man had to have earned some. It was after the war that village improvement started seriously, as the history of individual Orokaiva villages shows.

The eruption of Mount Lamington in 1951 came a few years after these beginnings, at a time when the impact of money was not yet great, though the government and mission had had time to communicate the new order they sought to establish and to press for changes the Orokaiva were not too ready to accept. The eruption strengthened the message. On the transactional level, there was the large-scale help offered by the Europeans after the eruption. This was done in the most dramatic way possible, by planes dropping their riches in great abundance shortly after the disaster. Certainly such a massive display of concern in a moment of need did much to enhance the image of Europeans as desirable exchange partners. This display was followed by the organization of the camps and by the widespread introduction, especially at Ilimo Camp, of activities that were symbolic of the 'new age'.

Daily church services were conducted, all children were given regular schooling, adults were educated in a number of new agricultural and technical skills, good medical services were provided, and regular food and clothing distributions continued. New ideas on housing, village layouts, and women's handicrafts, lectures on how trade goods are manufactured in Australia, the presence of a strong development-oriented and numerous European staff—all these elements must have amazed the Orokaiva villager of 1951,

biripa' in terms of a simple transactional sequence. The 'anger of God' can be similarly explained, though here the sequence is more complex. As a general device for constructing metalanguages, transactional sequences are of course wholly inadequate. I have, however, indicated that in the Orokaiva cognitive system God is classified as an exchange partner (though more powerful than all other possible partners).

The eruption thus becomes one of a sequence of signs which express the development of the exchange partnership with God. Similarly, in other explanatory systems, the eruption becomes part of a sequence of exchanges with Sumbiripa. It follows from this argument that the eruption changed the relationship with God or Sumbiripa, in the sense that a sign of such magnitude provoked a response. While the sign may have existed as such only in the minds of the Orokaiva, the response was on the level of real social, economic, political, and religious behavior. The general form of Orokaiva metalanguages, as exemplified in the case of the eruption, is sketched in figure 1.

EXPLANATIONS AND THE COGNITIVE SYSTEM

We have now surveyed the four explanations given of the eruption of Mount Lamington. In my discussion of the denotative systems, I concentrated on two of them: the anger of Sumbiripa and the anger of God. I did not specifically discuss the geophysical explanation because it was too summary for analysis, nor did I analyze the Yega explanation further because of the uncertainty about the agent of vengeance. We have seen that the four explanations were, in each case, not only a psychological response to calamity and a philosophical exercise but also expressed ideologies essentially unconnected with the eruption and that, in this respect, discourse about the eruption was actually rhetoric used to express the ideology.

The coexistence of four such ideologies in the same society poses obvious questions about their interrelations. Were they held by separate groups who did not communicate? Did they reflect divisions within the society? Furthermore, a formal problem arises: as these four explanatory systems all arise in one, fairly homogeneous society, are they in a sense cognate and do they display features of homology? On the basis of Orokaiva data, it may be possible to

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construct a higher-level system which accounts for all the explanations taken together.

Let us first survey the relationships between the explanatory systems on the social level. They do not logically contradict one another: they can be and are held simultaneously by the same people. There is no need to believe that the eruption was caused *either* by God *or* by Sumbiripa nor that the intended victims were *either* Orokaiva *or* Europeans. My informants did not seem to view God and Sumbiripa as wholly distinct. Whether one ascribed the eruption to one or the other depended on the context of the discourse. Most Orokaiva do connect the death of European public servants and army personnel at Higaturu with the hangings that occurred after the war. They believe that these Europeans acted wrongly and that God punished them. But at the same time they believe that the eruption was a sign of God's anger toward the Orokaiva who had not followed the laws of the Church of England.

One cannot, therefore, gauge the relative strength of the three ideologies by counting what proportion of a sample of Orokaiva informants subscribes to one or another of the three explanations. One can, however, evaluate the general effect of each of the three ideologies. The belief that Sumbiripa caused the eruption had only the mildest historical consequences—merely the reinforcement of a hunting taboo. The belief that the mountain erupted to punish Europeans might have become historically important if the mystical Yega cooperative movement had grown to a major millennial cult, but this did not happen. In fact, the Yega cooperatives went into a decline after 1951, owing to crop failure, the departure of its advisors, and governmental opposition in the form of economic and legal obstacles.

None of these reasons would have sufficed to kill the movement had there been, in the 1950s, a strong opposition to the administration of the Northern District. There is, however, no evidence of this. On the contrary there was, between 1951 and 1967, steadily increasing support for the ideologies advocated by government and mission. In this context the theory blaming the eruption on previous noncooperation by Orokaiva obtains some historical significance. It would be absurd to suggest that the increased support can actually be explained by the existence of the Orokaiva theory about the eruption. On the other hand, this support is now undoubtedly more powerfully motivated than if the eruption had

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so that the room for manipulation becomes greatly reduced. Furthermore, the church teaches a doctrine of obedience, which the Orokaiva nominally accept.

Taken at its face value, this would imply that the Orokaiva are satisfied to subordinate themselves to mission and government and do not consider themselves capable of serious competition with white authority. Such a notion of 'power'—that is, that it depends on obedience to white foreigners—has no rational basis in Orokaiva thought, since the bearer of 'power' cannot be subordinate to human power but only to spirit power. There are thus only two reasonable possibilities: either the ideology which made the eruption into a punishment by the Christian God denies the possibility that the Orokaiva henceforth can have 'power', or that ideology must make some distinction between, on the one hand, God and the principle of rightful authority (which should be obeyed on the pain of dire penalties) and, on the other hand, the existing ecclesiastical and political power bearers (who need not be regarded as having perpetual rightful authority). The position taken by Orokaiva informants on this question is not in the least ambiguous.

The Orokaiva are willing to obey the present power bearers, but only on the ground that they feel unready at present to assume power themselves. They regard the existing relationship as temporary. They are able to state this openly, since the Australian administration claims to prepare the way for early autonomy and optional independence. On the surface, there appears to be no acute political conflict.

In fact, however, the 'new age' ideology is fiercely competitive. The activities it advocates are perceived by Orokaiva as leading to a balance of power between the Europeans and themselves. The strong interest in schooling, savings clubs, coffee production, village improvement, wage labor, and so forth was explained time and again by the argument that these activities would ultimately place Papuans on the same level as Europeans and would remove the power differential. It was explained that in the 'new age' one no longer kills and eats the enemy because victory must now be achieved by different means. The reforms advocated by mission and government are perceived as the first weapons in the armory needed for victory. Victory, however, should not be understood here in the European sense, where it implies a permanent defeat of

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the enemy, but rather in the Papuan sense, where one contends with exchange partners in an inconclusive tug-of-war and the strength of the opponents is approximately equal. Victory, in other words, is the establishment of an equal rather than an unequal relationship.

Given this view of the European-Orokaiva relationship, it is difficult to distinguish between millenarian and gradualist ideologies among the Orokaiva. They are all, in a sense, millenarian, even though they advocate full collaboration with both mission and government. From the more objective view I have taken here, the three Orokaiva ideologies present at the time of the eruption all convey the same message. They are all concerned with the restoration of what the Orokaiva call 'power', which always implies some form of power balance between themselves and their colonial masters.

IDEOLOGY, POWER, AND LAND

As we have seen, all Orokaiva discourse about the eruption can be reduced to one basic theme: competition for power between Papuans and Europeans. I have not surveyed administration discourse about the eruption in the same detail, but it is safe to say that, apart from the mechanics of relief, the administration was likewise concerned with one central ideological theme, namely socioeconomic development. Our structural analysis would hardly be adequate unless we considered the relation between these two ideologies, not only in abstract terms but also in the framework of concrete events.

During the period immediately after the disaster, the administration planned to make the evacuation camps the beginning of permanent relocation under conditions where socioeconomic development throughout the region could be accelerated (Belshaw 1951; Keesing 1952; Plant 1951). While this relocation was being planned, the evacuees were adamant that they wished to go home as soon as possible (Belshaw 1951; Kaad, personal communication). That the administration gave in to the evacuees should not be regarded as a Papuan demonstration of their own power but rather as a necessary response to practical problems facing Orokaiva as swidden agriculturists lacking a secure system of individual, unencumbered landholding. The circumstances of the closing

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administrators, accustomed to secure forms of land tenure in their own culture, could not fully share the Orokaiva anxiety about losing their land.

This conflict between people and administration was settled amicably. It did, however, emphasize the fundamental difference between Orokaiva and European perceptions of the crisis. For the Orokaiva, it was the relatives—the holders of residual rights to land—who were viewed as the greatest danger, whereas the volcano was soon considered less dangerous. For the European, the relatives were not perceived as dangerous, as it was imagined they could somehow be controlled by the legal weapons available to centralized government. On the other hand, the danger of the volcano was viewed far more gravely, for the Europeans knew of no way to control future eruptions.

Both sides had a strong case in this disagreement. The Orokaiva had a strong case because the Europeans had no institutions that could have protected them against encroachments on their land. There was (and is) no adequate registry. The administration's case rested on its logical consistency with the development ideology it was trying to inculcate. The traditional Orokaiva land tenure system is incompatible with development because it impedes spatial movement and the traditional extended exchange network lacks the flexibility of a market system. Modernization depends on the creation of large corporate groups with well-defined systems of rights and obligations, instead of the subtle but essentially unstable web of warfare, diplomacy, affinity, and friendship. The 'new age' ideology of 1951, though fortified by the experience of the eruption, did not envisage modernization in this basic sense, while in 1966–1967 the implications of the 'new age' for land tenure and the kinship system were just being discovered.

This analysis of the 'new age' ideology indicates that it is related only loosely to social and economic development. It arises directly out of political competition between the Orokaiva, the mission, and the government. Whenever new techniques appear to the Orokaiva to serve this power struggle, their adoption is advocated. We have seen that a traumatic event such as the eruption of Mount Lamington, when it became the subject of Orokaiva philosophizing, was at once put at the service of this competitive struggle. Even when obedience to ecclesiastical and administrative rules is advocated by the ideology—and when the dire conse-

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quences of disobedience are stressed by the ideology—such an attitude is viewed by Orokaiva not as part of a permanent new order but as a temporary expedient, a ploy in the power struggle.

Reform is advocated in terms of such strategy. Over the last fifteen years we have seen that the Orokaiva have begun to accept the idea of converting land titles to sole tenure, as well as the inevitable consequences of such conversion for kinship organization. Such changes are explained in ideological terms as a necessary part of the competitive struggle against Europeans. The fact that Europeans view the same move as serving the cause of social and economic development is almost a coincidence.

Perhaps the most important practical conclusion we can draw about the genesis of cognitive structures has to do with the nature of power competition between Orokaiva and the administration. It is often supposed that development and political competition are separate processes in conflict with one another. The case in question shows that the Orokaiva view both aspects as part of an ongoing exchange relationship. It will have been noticed that in political debate Papuans, especially those in the villages, are reluctant to seek immediate political independence from Australia, even though tensions clearly exist. The point here is that they like to see the exchange relationships with their Australian partners continue, even though they wish to improve greatly their own position in that relationship. It may be, of course, that this attitude will change later. In the exchange relationship their own very considerable prestation is their subordination to foreign authority. In return they are receiving educational benefits which they value highly—not, fundamentally, because these benefits increase their private incomes but rather because they maximize Orokaiva power in the exchange relationship.

In addition, the material presented here may have theoretical implications with regard to the genesis and dynamics of cognitive structures. We must distinguish here between macro- and micro-processes. For the purpose of the discussion, I have assumed that the Orokaiva world view, with its notions of exchange and power, remained unchanged between 1951 and 1966. This assumption was convenient for the analysis, but it must be qualified. In 1966 I was given geophysical explanations of the eruption as well as magico-religious ones, and the former (though feebly held by a small elite) do prefigure a basic structural change in the Orokaiva

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10. Compare this with the school at Sasembata, which teaches to grade six.
11. A small band of Orokaiva captured European fugitives, including male and female missionaries, and handed them over to the Japanese. The members of this band came from the area east of Mount Lamington inhabited by what Williams called the Sauaha tribe.
12. Though the Sumbiripa cycle of myths was not noted by Williams, I feel confident it existed prior to 1951, partly on evidence given in Schwimmer (1969) and partly on the evidence of a myth recorded in Belshaw (1951).
13. For sources on Orokaiva leadership, see Reay (1953) and Schwimmer (1967).
14. The term "Waseta tribe" used by Williams is perhaps unfortunate, as I demonstrated elsewhere (Schwimmer 1969:49–53). It is used here for the sake of convenience to group together the people from the Waseta area, all of whom were quartered at Ilimo evacuation camp. The name "Waseta" is not used as a tribal name by Orokaiva; it denotes no more than the village where Williams happened to do his fieldwork.
15. See also Waddell and Krinks (1968:16, fn. 3). In the final section of this chapter, I argue that the geophysical explanation is important for anthropological analysis, since it foreshadows structural change in the Orokaiva cognitive system.
16. These two oppositions are, as I understand it, singled out for detailed study in most of the chapters in this comparative volume. Unfortunately, a more detailed discussion is impossible in this chapter. Transactions between government and people during the relocation process have been described fully in Schwimmer (1969), including the massive administration intervention in the evacuation camps, the changes of location of government and mission centers after the eruption, and the gradual widening of the scope of government and mission activities. In my earlier report, I also referred in detail to the manner in which the relation between whites and Papuans is mediated by Papuan mission teachers, village constables, and other functionaries. On an ideological level the entire 'new age' rhetoric discussed in this chapter may be regarded as a form of mediation between microsystem and macrosystem.

    With regard to boundary maintenance, empirical evidence is available in my earlier report about the relations between the evacuees and the people among whom they lived. At Ilimo something akin to traditional friendly host-guest relations were established. I stress in the present essay the ambiguity of the boundary maintenance patterns. There is an ideology advocating unity and there is increasing evidence of common action, especially in the context of formal organizations set up under the influence of administration and mission, while individual webs of intertribal relationships tend to become denser as a result of migration associated with schooling, employment, and so forth. At the same time, tribalism is still the underlying principle in most transactional contexts.
17. This does not contradict my earlier statement (1969:66) that there was a brief period when the evacuees feared the government would take their land. Kaad reported to me that this fear existed, and I do not doubt it. In

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between the other two. Their existence is known, but some will not see their cognitive genesis. They tend to arise as they are logically implied by the two dominant ones; anyone who does not like 1 and 2 cannot help but think of 3 or 4 or both.

Identification in the Creation of Use Values

When Councillor Colin said that '*pure ari*' did not begin until Jesus Christ (i.e. people did not 'work' before that time) he ignored that *pure ari* in its primary meaning stands for 'to garden' and *pure* is a garden. From an empirical viewpoint we know exactly what goes on in a Sivepe garden, as Waddell has carefully measured it. The daily visit to the garden described by informants as *pure ali* takes a mean of 265 minutes of which 'main task' and 'ancillary tasks' take up in all 44.2% (Waddell and Krinks 1968: 113). The rest is devoted to travel, rest, meals, cooking, washing, other tasks. People always go to the *pure*; they do what they need to do. The amount of 'work' they have does not determine how long they stay. Sometimes they 'work' very hard, sometimes hardly at all.

The gardening tasks are done at a moderate pace which is pleasurable. Rushing and heavy burdens are avoided when possible, but when they are necessary they are classified as 'toil' (*pure gaiha*) and people rest later to make up for it. The only time measures used are: early morning, midday, afternoon (meaning: time to go home) and evening-night (meaning: after supper). Though gardens have a principal crop, mostly taro, the subsidiary crops, ornamental trees, garden house etc. are charmingly landscaped so that the garden is in a sense an artistic creation (Malinowski 1935; F. Panoff 1969). Whether rows are regular and what is the general standard of husbandry are very much individual matters. It is said that by looking at a person's garden one can read his or her character. Among the Orokaiva the girls are said always to look at a boy's garden before marrying him. De Coppet (1976) reports the same for the Are'are of Malaita, except that it is the girls who are more under scrutiny. The criteria would partly be the style of the garden, showing a pattern of mind, but also and largely the size of the garden, the size and the health of the plants, the quality of the varieties.

One could keep on with such description for a long time without coming closer to defining garden work as a concept. Myths and rites prescribe details of the gardening cycle for each of the principal crops while at the same time establishing identification between grower and crop: taro is a mother; a mother Taro is invoked; married women think of their taro as their children. The

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is the contemporary case where money replaces traditional valuables. Is this money a 'use value'? Anthropologists have often analyzed it as such and not without some justification; the Orokaiva for instance present brideprice banknotes tied one by one to a tall sapling carried aloft by the donor and thus transported to the wifegiver. After presentation it is often stored in wait for other similar occasions. The fact is, however, that eventually this treasure is converted into exchange values. Furthermore, it owes its status as a valuable to its potential exchange value. It is therefore more easily accounted for in the preset four-system method of analysis as will appear later.

The same remark may be made in respect of labour assistance between households which is normally given without payments except for a meal at the end of the day. If, however, the service is given in connection with work for which the person assisted will eventually get paid, then the service falls within a different category and must be paid for. The same rule applies to the granting of land useholds for which no rent is ever demanded if the land produces (only) use values, but the situation changes when it produces exchange values. Use value is therefore a concept determining Orokaiva behaviour.

Finally, it is as true of the Orokaiva as of the ancient Greeks that conflict and war (*isoro*) did not have a necessarily negative connotation connotation. They might be bad or good according to circumstances. War, sorcery and other forms of negative reciprocity are part of this mode of production; they cannot be equated to 'alienation'. There is increasing evidence that Levi-Strauss (1943) was correct in viewing war in these societies as a modality of interdependence.

To sum up, the Orokaiva had a basic classification of *pure* as between subsistence and feasting. An inspection of the crop by the feast-giver was needed to let crops pass from the subsistence to the feasting category. (It was not done if the harvest was insufficient.) The term *pure ari*, whatever its customary translation into English, was never used to denote any kind of effectiveness in ensuring a food supply. In case of garden failure, people did not ascribe it to neglectful *pure ari* but rather to neglectful *simbari*. It is the demigods of the various crops and the ancestors who do the actual producing in the garden, and all that is expected of man is to clear, to plant and to protect against magical and technical dangers. Watchfulness is the key; toil is a consequence. A flawless garden testifies to watchfulness in the first instance; to physical prowess also, but only in the second instance. In this respect i.e. the technical as well as the magical watchfulness, *pure ari* is intermediate between the Greek concepts of ΕΡΓΟΝ and ΤΕΧΝΗ.